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INTRODUCTION
Originalism is ascendant. Consider District of Columbia v. Heller,1 in which the
Supreme Court, confronting the Second Amendment “right of the people to keep
and bear Arms,”2 invalidated the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the
possession of handguns in light of “the original understanding of the Second
Amendment.”3 The relevant “understanding,” the Court added, was that of the
framing-era public:
“[T]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning.” Normal meaning may of course
include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the
founding generation.4

† Copyright © 2012 Lawrence Rosenthal.
* Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law. Many thanks are owed to
Isa Lang and the staff of Chapman University School of Law’s Rinker Law Library for
highly capable research assistance. I am deeply grateful to Jack Balkin, Saul Cornell,
Richard Kay, Donald Kochan, Ron Rotunda, George Thomas, and Adam Winkler for their
enormously helpful comments on prior drafts. They did their best to set me straight; any
errors that remain are entirely my own.
1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”).
3. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625.
4. Id. at 576–77 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)) (citation
omitted).
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This, of course, is originalism, which “regards the discoverable meaning of the
Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of
5
constitutional interpretation in the present.” Notably, in Heller, the Court’s
originalism was not based on the intentions of the Constitution’s framers—an
approach that has been criticized as unacceptably indeterminate and inconsistent
6
with the framing-era understandings about how legal texts should be interpreted —
but instead was based on the original meaning of constitutional text as understood
7
by the framing-era public. In this embrace of original meaning, Heller was no
sport; in recent years, for example, the Court has used originalism to revolutionize

5. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 599
(2004). Although this definition will suffice for present purposes, Lawrence Solum has
provided a helpful elaboration:
[M]ost or almost all originalists agree that original meaning was fixed or
determined at the time each provision of the constitution was framed and
ratified. We might call this idea the fixation thesis. It is no surprise that
originalists agree on the fixation thesis. The term “originalism” was coined to
describe a family of textualist and intentionalist approaches to constitutional
interpretation and construction that were associated with phrases like “original
intentions,” “original meaning,” and “original understanding.” These phrases
and the word “originalist” share the root word “origin.” The idea that meaning
is fixed at the time of origination for each constitutional provision serves as the
common denominator for all of these expressions. Thus, the fixation thesis
might be described as a core idea around which all or almost all originalist
theories organize themselves.
Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist
Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
12, 33 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) [hereafter THE CHALLENGE OF
ORIGINALISM] (emphasis in original).
6. See, e.g., LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION
284–398 (1988); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 340–65 (1996); Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in
Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 445, 456–74 (1984); Paul Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 209–22 (1980); Paul Finkelman,
The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 349, 351–58 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of
Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 948 (1985). For responses to these criticisms from
advocates of original-intention originalism, see, for example, Larry Alexander,
Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at 87, 89–94;
Raoul Berger, The Founders’ Views—According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1033,
1055–76 (1989); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 236–84 (1988);
Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST. COMMENT.
77 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, The Failure of Attacks on Constitutional Originalism, 4 CONST.
COMMENT. 43 (1987).
7. For a useful typology of the various approaches to originalist constitutional
interpretation, see Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239,
247–67 (2009).
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its sentencing jurisprudence, as well as its approach to the Sixth Amendment’s
8
Confrontation Clause.
Originalism stands in opposition to nonoriginalism, which does not regard
9
original meaning as authoritative. Perhaps nonoriginalism’s classic exposition
came from Justice Holmes:
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, like
the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they have
called into life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. It was enough
for them to realize or to hope that they had created an organism; it has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood to
prove that they created a nation. The case before us must be considered
in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was
said a hundred years ago.10
The emergence of originalism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence parallels its
emergence in the academy. In recent decades, originalism has been advocated by a
growing and diverse group of scholars who, although often taking different
positions on the particulars of originalist interpretation, agree that the
Constitution’s status as a written legal text means that constitutional interpretation
should be governed by the meaning of text as it was understood in the framing
era.11 One leading scholar has claimed that among academics, originalism has

8. For useful discussions of the manner in which originalism has revolutionized the
Court’s jurisprudence in these areas, see, for example, Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists,
Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044–64,
1068–69 (2006); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The
Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183,
189–99 (2005); John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court: Did the Supreme Court Really
Move Left Because of Embarrassment over Bush v. Gore?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1475, 1476–81
(2006); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Originalism and Economic Analysis: Two Case Studies of
Consistency and Coherence in Supreme Court Decision Making, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 217, 231–32 (2010); and Antonin Scalia, Foreword, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 871,
871–72 (2008).
9. A typology of nonoriginalism can be derived from Philip Bobbitt’s modalities of
constitutional argument, which include historical, textual, prudential, ethical, structural, and
doctrinal argument. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 3–119 (1982). Of these modalities, only the first is originalist. Even historical
argument, however, does not qualify as originalist under the definition offered above if it is
based on understandings of constitutional text that emerged after the framing era, as is
sometimes the case. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1797–1812 (2007); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 33–76 (1998); Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutional Theory Transformed,
108 YALE L.J. 2115, 2138–41 (1999).
10. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
11. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 35–37 (2011); RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 92–117 (2004);
GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE CONSTITUTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
67–90 (1992); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 28–
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become “the prevailing approach to constitutional interpretation.”12 As a normative
matter, originalism is said to offer three primary virtues. First, it is said to
appropriately constrain the judiciary by confining it to the interpretation of legal
text.13 Second, it is thought to reflect the proper role of the judiciary in a republican
form of government by treating as binding the judgments made by the framers and
ratifiers when adopting constitutional text.14 Third, originalism is said to lead to
53 (1994); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 160–212 (1999); Hans W. Baade, “Original
Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1103–07
(1991); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 550–59 (1994); Robert N. Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal
Realism, and the Interpretation of “This Constitution,” 72 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1186–259
(1987); Charles Fried, Sonnet LXV and the “Black Ink” of the Framers’ Intention, 100
HARV. L. REV. 751, 756–60 (1987); Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”:
Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textual Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1607, 1641–67 (2009); Kay, supra note 6, at 229–36; Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J.
1113, 1127–48 (2003); Gary Lawson, On Reading Recipes . . . and Constitutions, 85 GEO.
L.J. 1823, 1833–36 (1997); Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial
Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1278–87 (1997); Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the
Constitution (and How Not to), 115 YALE L.J. 2037, 2056–62 (2006); Saikrishna B. Prakash,
Unoriginalism’s Law Without Meaning, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 541–45 (1998)
(reviewing RAKOVE, supra note 6); Ronald D. Rotunda, Original Intent, the View of the
Framers, and the Role of the Ratifiers, 41 VAND. L. REV. 507, 512–14 (1988); Lawrence B.
Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 940–55
(2009).
12. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613
(1999). For accounts of the turn toward originalism among legal scholars see, for example,
DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM
20–154 (2005); and JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 101–216 (2005).
13. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 11, at 100–09; PERRY, supra note 11, at 31–38;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 50–61; Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality
of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 288–91 (1996); Lino A. Graglia,
“Interpreting” the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1020–29 (1992);
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 854 (1989); Steven D.
Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 105–06 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, We
Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 38–42 (Robert W.
Bennett & Lawrence B. Solum eds., 2011) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM].
14. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 54-56; ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143–60 (1990); WHITTINGTON, supra note
11, at 152–59; Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1119, 1121–26 (1998); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse
Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1440, 1444–46 (2007); Jonathan R. Macey, Originalism
as an “Ism”, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 307–08 (1996); Michael W. McConnell,
Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1132–37 (1998);
Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION]; Solum, supra note 13, at 42–44.
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desirable outcomes by protecting legal commitments that reflect fundamental
values.15
To be sure, originalism has its critics, who deny that originalism follows from
the character of the Constitution as a written text,16 or vindicates popular
sovereignty within republican government.17 The critics also claim that originalism
is not required or even able to impose adequate constraint on the judiciary given the
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and the rigor of many nonoriginalist
approaches.18 The critics add that originalism enshrines framing-era understandings
even when they come to be regarded as outmoded or unjust.19
The scholarly debate over originalism often seems abstract. Supporters and
opponents debate the theoretical merits of originalism, but rarely test their views on
the merits of originalism by reference to the realities of constitutional adjudication.

15. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 82–88
(2009); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution,
98 GEO. L.J. 1693, 1698–733 (2010).
16. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 115–18 (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY
THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 20–32 (2009); Mitchell
N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 38–68 (2009); Andrew B. Coan, The
Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1025 (2010);
Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 282–87; Tara Smith, Originalism’s Misplaced Fidelity:
“Original” Meaning Is Not Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 25–53 (2009).
17. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 32–39
(2001); Berman, supra note 16, at 69–75; Brest, supra note 6, at 225–29; Coan, supra note
16, at 853–57; Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 388–91 (1997);
Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 187–
202 (2008); Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can
Originalist Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1482, 1499–501 (1985); Smith,
supra note 16, at 13–24; Mark S. Stein, Originalism and Original Exclusions, 98 KY. L.J.
397, 448–56 (2009–10); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63
U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 928–34 (1996).
18. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 76–
78 (2010); BREYER, supra note 16, at 118–27; DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY,
DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS 11–21 (2002); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 18–21 (2010);
Robert W. Bennett, Originalism and the Living American Constitution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM, supra note 13, at 78, 87–114; Berman, supra note 16, at 75–77, 88–93; Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103
HARV. L. REV. 43, 92–103 (1989); Coan, supra note 16, at 1047–70; Colby & Smith, supra
note 7, at 288–305; Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 907, 911–13 (2008); Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and the
Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 277–82 (2005); Suzanna Sherry,
The Indeterminacy of Historical Evidence, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 440–41 (1996).
19. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 18, at 78–79; STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 12–18;
SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 69–92; Scott W. Howe, Slavery as Punishment: Original Public
Meaning, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth
Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 1019–32 (2009); Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of
Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 358–61 (2007); Adam M. Samaha,
Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295, 1331–49 (2008).
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In science, a theory gains acceptance if it makes testable predictions that are later
borne out.20 Perhaps we cannot expect the precision of science from legal theory,
but surely we ought to expect something like it.21 Whatever its theoretical merit,
originalism deserves recognition as a genuinely distinctive and useful approach to
constitutional adjudication only if, in practice, it provides a genuinely originalist
vehicle for deciding real cases—that is, by reference to the meaning of
constitutional text as historically fixed at the time of framing and ratification—
when nonoriginalists would decide them otherwise. Yet the scholarly literature to
date makes no effort to address that question. This Article aims to fill this gap by
assessing how originalist interpretations of the Constitution fare in practice.22
To the extent that originalism demands that constitutional text be treated as
binding, there is no real difference between originalism and nonoriginalism.
Nonoriginalists rarely if ever contend the language of the Constitution can be
ignored when it is inconsistent with contemporary sensibilities; to the contrary,
they readily acknowledge that constitutional text is binding and that constitutional
adjudication is properly concerned with interpreting rather than remaking the
Constitution’s text, even if text is afforded evolving content to maintain its
relevance to contemporary circumstances.23 Accordingly, nonoriginalist
constitutional adjudication reflects the primacy of constitutional text. When
embracing on nonoriginalist grounds the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause forbids apportioning state legislative districts on any basis
other than population, for example, the Supreme Court never suggested that the
Constitution’s allocation of two senators to each state can somehow be ignored as
inconsistent with the current understanding of the constitutional mandate of equal

20. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
21. Cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reviews and Legal Scholarship: Some Comments,
75 DENV. U. L. REV. 661, 668 (1998) (“In most fields, a theory has to be testable; it is a
hypothesis, a prediction, and therefore subject to proof. When legal scholars use the word
‘theory,’ they seem to mean (most of the time) something they consider deep, original, and
completely untestable.”).
22. About the only effort along these lines in the literature to date is a study of the
Supreme Court’s federalism decisions demonstrating that the use of originalism fails to
eliminate ideological differences among Members of the Court. See Peter J. Smith, Sources
of Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of the Court’s Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 217 (2004).
23. See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 18, at 80–81; EISGRUBER, supra note 17, at 31–32;
Bennett, supra note 18, at 139–40; Brest, supra note 6, at 228–29, 234–37; Coan, supra note
16, at 1047–66; Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713,
749–55 (2011); Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional
Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1796–99 (1997); Charles A.
Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673, 734–36 (1963);
Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62 HASTINGS L.J.
707, 722–24 (2011); Strauss, supra note 17, at 906–23; Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 65, 71–73; see also STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S
QUANDARY 131 (2004) (“[T]he form of judicial activism that appears to enjoy substantial
support insists that judges interpret the law, not reauthor it; but they should interpret in a
creative fashion and not be confined to ascertaining the supposed intentions of the
enactors.”).
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protection, but instead noted that the Constitution’s text offers no basis for state
legislatures to be apportioned in the same manner as the United States Senate.24
The advocates of a “living Constitution” instead make the more limited claim that
contemporary understandings are of use in interpreting the broadest, most openended provisions in the Constitution.25 For their part, even committed originalists
acknowledge that the original meaning of constitutional text is sometimes vague or
ambiguous,26 requiring what they characterize as nonoriginalist construction rather
than interpretation on the basis of original meaning.27 Thus, whatever its theoretical
merits, originalism offers a workable and distinctive approach to constitutional
adjudication only if it provides a vehicle for utilizing the historically fixed meaning
of constitutional text as a means of reducing the interpretive leeway claimed by
nonoriginalists.
The discussion that follows examines whether, in practice, originalism offers a
method for using the framing-era meaning of constitutional text to reduce the scope
of textual vagueness and ambiguity that gives rise to nonoriginalist constitutional
adjudication. Part I explores the efforts of originalists to reduce the scope of textual
vagueness and ambiguity by relying on framing-era understandings and practices as
a means of fleshing out the original meaning of constitutional text—what I will call
“original-expected-applications” originalism. Part II explores “semantic
originalism,” in which what is regarded as interpretively binding is not the original
meaning of constitutional text as reflected by its original expected applications, but
instead the original semantic meaning of constitutional text stated at the level of
generality found in the text.28 Part III examines the leading ostensibly originalist

24. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 574–77 (1964).
25. See, e.g., SOTIROS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 155–70 (2007); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 27–42, 111–18 (2001); GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S.
KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH THE CONSTITUTION 25–40
(2010); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 50–58 (2006); STRAUSS, supra note 18, at 7–10, 102–14;
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 8–19 (1991);
Bennett, supra note 18, at 124–25; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United
States: Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 23, 25–32 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 709–10, 714–17 (1975).
26. For present purposes, Professor Solum’s definition of vague or ambiguous text is
helpful: “Vagueness: A term or phrase is vague if and only if it admits of borderline (or
uncertain) cases”; and “Ambiguity: A term or phrase is ambiguous in the strict or
philosophical sense when it has more than one sense or meaning.” Lawrence B. Solum,
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 415 (2009)
(emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
27. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 14, 31–32; BARNETT, supra note 11, at 118–30;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 5–14; Solum, supra note 26, at 436–42; Grégoire C.N.
Webber, Originalism’s Constitution, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at
147, 173–76. For a more general discussion of the distinction between interpretation and
construction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 95, 101–08 (2010).
28. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between an originalism based on original
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decisions of recent years to determine whether originalism, in practice, has proven
able to make constitutional adjudication turn on historical evidence of the original
meaning of constitutional text.
I. ORIGINAL EXPECTED APPLICATIONS
Perhaps the leading originalist account that denies the possibility of ascribing
evolving content to constitutional text is original-expected-applications originalism.
This account does not claim that textual vagueness or ambiguity disappears merely
by consulting the framing-era meaning of the words used in the Constitution’s text,
and with reason. Consider, for example, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
“unreasonable searches and seizures.”29 Two schools of thought have emerged
about the original meaning of the phrase. One relies on evidence that the term
“unreasonable,” at least in a legal context, was understood in the framing era as a
“pejorative synonym for gross illegality or unconstitutionality,”30 while the other
contends that in the framing era the term meant pretty much what it means today—
“contrary to sound judgment, inappropriate, or excessive.”31 For present purposes,
it hardly matters which is correct; the original semantic meaning of the Fourth
Amendment seems little more than a conclusion. Original meaning must be defined
with greater specificity if it is to provide meaningful guidance to constitutional
adjudication.32 The kind of vague or ambiguous text that nonoriginalists claim as
their domain, however, resists such specificity. Original-expected-applications
expected applications and a semantic form of originalism, which the author labels
“skyscraper originalism” and “framework originalism,” respectively, see BALKIN, supra note
11, at 21–34.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its drafting history sheds little light on the original meaning
of this phrase. The Amendment began as a single clause forbidding unreasonable search and
seizure “by warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not
particularly describing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be seized.” THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 223 (Neil H.
Cogan ed., 1997). The text was changed during debate in the House to create a freestanding
clause prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, and in the most complete analysis of the
limited historical materials, Thomas Davies concluded that the alteration was intended to do
no more than phrase the prohibition on general warrants in an imperative fashion because of
the paucity of evidence that anyone intended to make a substantive change to the original
proposal. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 716–24 (1999). That view may well be correct as a matter of congressional intent,
but the inference that Professor Davies draws from the legislative history is of little
significance in determining the original public meaning of the proposal—at least absent
evidence that the public or at least the ratifiers were aware of a congressional intent to
preserve the substance of the original proposal in a two-clause format. There is, however,
virtually no surviving evidence that sheds any light on the understanding of the Fourth
Amendment in the ratifying states. See WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT:
ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602–1791, at 712–23 (2009).
30. Davies, supra note 29, at 693.
31. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1739, 1781 (2000).
32. For a helpful discussion of the challenges presented for originalism when
constitutional text is defined at a high level of generality, see TRIBE & DORF, supra note 25,
at 31–64.
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originalism meets this challenge with the claim that textual vagueness and
ambiguity can be addressed by using framing-era understandings and practices as a
means of fleshing out the meaning of constitutional text.
Likely the most prominent contemporary originalist, Justice Scalia professes
adherence to original-expected-applications originalism. Justice Scalia does not
claim that the original semantic meaning of constitutional text alone does much to
reduce the scope of textual vagueness or ambiguity; to the contrary, he
acknowledges that the Constitution contains much that is “abstract and general
rather than specific and concrete,”33 but contends that “[t]he context suggests that
the abstract and general terms, like the concrete and particular ones, are meant to
nail down current rights, rather than aspire after future ones—that they are abstract
and general references to extant rights and freedoms possessed under the thencurrent regime.”34 Thus, reference to the manner in which rights and freedoms were
applied in the framing era, we are told, can resolve textual vagueness and
ambiguity.
Taking a different route to original-expected-applications originalism, John
McGinnis and Michael Rappaport have argued that a commitment to originalism
entails the use of the interpretive devices that were in general acceptance in the
framing era, including reliance on the generally accepted original understanding of
a legal text and the drafters’ intentions rather than permitting the kind of
evolutionary approach favored by nonoriginalists.35 Utilizing this original-methods
originalism, they argue that the framing generation’s expectations as to the manner
in which constitutional text would be applied provide powerful evidence of original
meaning.36 As a means of addressing the difficulties of ascertaining a collective
intent of the framers or ratifiers and applying it to concrete constitutional debates,
those who advocate a purposivist brand of originalism, in which textual meaning is
based on the original intentions underlying constitutional text, similarly find
framing-era practices and understandings to be an essential means of identifying
original intentions.37 Despite the differences in these accounts, all utilize the
framing-era understanding of the text to give content to the open-ended
constitutional provisions that nonoriginalists claim as their own.

33. Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 14, at 129,
135.
34. Id. (emphasis in original).
35. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A
New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751,
758–72 (2009).
36. See John O. McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, Original Interpretive Principles as the
Core of Originalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 371, 378–81 (2007). Others similarly contend
that framing-era practices and understandings provide potent evidence of original meaning.
See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Fidelity to History—and Through It, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1627,
1654–55 (1997); Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 525–38 (2003); John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The
Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167, 172–74 (1996).
37. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 6, at 253; Steven D. Smith, Reply to Koppelman:
Originalism and the (Merely) Human Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 189, 194–99
(2010).
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A. Strong Original-Expected-Applications Originalism
Original-expected-applications originalism comes in strong and weak forms.
Strong original-expected-applications originalism treats the framing-era’s
understanding of the manner in which constitutional text would be applied as
controlling, while weaker versions permit departures from framing-era
understandings upon what is regarded as an adequate justification.38
The classic argument against the strong form of original-expected-applications
originalism points to Brown v. Board of Education,39 noting that racially segregated
schools remained common throughout the country even after the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore were likely consistent with the framing-era
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.40 The charge that strong originalexpected-applications originalism cannot justify Brown seems a damning one; as
Pamela Karlan has written, “because Brown has become the crown jewel of the
United States Reports, every constitutional theory must claim Brown for itself.”41
Indeed, the response of most originalists to Brown is to condemn reliance on
original expected applications and argue that racial segregation is inconsistent with
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s textual commitment to
equality, even if the framing generation did not yet understand the implications of
the constitutional text it had ratified.42
Still, some endeavor to reconcile Brown with original-expected-applications
originalism. Justice Scalia, for example, believes that the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment condemns all racial discrimination,43 and since, in his view, framingera practices and understandings are relevant only to resolve ambiguities in
constitutional text, they need not be consulted in this instance because the text of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause is unambiguous when it
comes to racial discrimination.44 Yet the clarity of the constitutional command that

38. I have borrowed from Mitchell Berman the concept of the “strength” of originalism.
See Berman, supra note 16, at 10–11.
39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1885–93 (1995).
41. Pamela S. Karlan, What Can Brown® Do for You?: Neutral Principles and the
Struggle over the Equal Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049, 1060 (2009).
42. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 14, at 81–83; PERRY, supra note 11, at 42–44; Lawrence
Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395, 423–
26 (1995). But see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions,
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1092–105 (1995) (arguing that Brown can be reconciled with framingera understandings by noting that majorities in Reconstruction-era Congresses expressed
opposition to segregation during consideration of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
though admittedly not the requisite two-thirds majority to amend the Constitution).
43. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346–49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 353–54 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
44. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–96 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Justice Scalia added that support for segregation was not unbroken in the
framing era since segregation was challenged in some quarters and denounced by Justice
Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Plessy. See id. This may be so, but it is far from a
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no “State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws,”45 when applied to the separate-but-equal segregation at issue in Brown, is
surely open to doubt. As Herbert Wechsler famously wrote in defense of the
Court’s decision upholding separate-but-equal segregation in Plessy v. Ferguson46:
“In the context of a charge that segregation with equal facilities is a denial of
equality, is there not a point in Plessy in the statement that if ‘enforced separation
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority’ it is solely because its members
choose ‘to put that construction upon it’?”47 Unless Professor Wechsler is regarded
as having lacked a basic understanding of the English language, something more
than the unadorned text is required to support Brown.
But put Brown aside. Justice Scalia has acknowledged that “originalism is
strong medicine,” and admits, “in a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted
originalist.”48 Perhaps the difficulty of hewing to original expected applications
when it comes to racial segregation has caused Justice Scalia to flinch. The fact that
extreme cases may produce a “faint-hearted” originalism, however, need not
discredit the approach as a general matter. After all, in many other cases, Justice
Scalia has faithfully relied on framing-era practices and understandings to flesh out
the original meaning of otherwise vague or ambiguous constitutional text.49 Surely
the case against original-expected-applications originalism should not be based
solely on the one example of Brown.

demonstration that segregation was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s original
public meaning as reflected in predominant framing-era practice and understandings.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
46. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
47. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 33 (1959) (emphasis in original) (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551). Justice Scalia’s
position is even more puzzling because when it comes to segregation by sex, he thinks that
framing-era practice is properly consulted. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568–
70 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Equal Protection Clause, however, offers its
protections to every “person,” without textual reference to either race or sex. It is therefore
hard to understand how the text could be regarded as unambiguous as to race but ambiguous
as to sex, requiring reference to framing-era practice for the latter but not the former.
48. Scalia, supra note 13, at 863–64.
49. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2833–36 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (First Amendment Free Speech Clause); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
843–49 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Suspension of Habeas Corpus Clause); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595–98 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Due Process Clause); Board of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 687–90 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First
Amendment Free Speech Clause); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 568–70 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Equal Protection Clause); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980–
85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment);
Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 60–66 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Fourth
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure); Rutan v. Republican Party of
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 95–97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (First Amendment Free Speech
Clause).
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1. The Incompleteness of Strong Original-Expected-Applications Originalism
At the outset, we can put aside the objection that evidence of framing-era
practices and understandings may sometimes be confusing or in conflict. Although
Justice Scalia himself has acknowledged that it will often be difficult to sort
through framing-era evidence,50 if an approach to constitutional interpretation is
acceptable only if it produces no difficult cases, none could bear scrutiny.51
Another threshold objection contends that framing-era practices and understandings
are an unreliable indicator of constitutional provisions that are aspirational in
nature.52 Even for constitutional provisions with an aspirational character, however,
practices and understandings that survived the wake of ratification could surely be
thought consistent with original meaning.
A more serious problem is that original-expected-applications originalism will
be of no help in addressing issues that did not arise in the framing era. Consider
Weems v. United States.53 At issue was whether the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments”54 barred the use of cadena
temporal—a punishment originating in the Spanish Penal Code involving fifteen
years at hard labor while painfully shackled, followed by permanent surveillance
and disqualification from any position of public trust and the loss of parental and
other civil rights—for falsifying entries involving relatively small sums in
government ledgers.55 The Court explained that the evidence from the framing era
suggested that the Eighth Amendment was intended to prohibit the kinds of

50. See Scalia, supra note 13, at 856–61.
51. To be sure, the difficulty of assessing historical evidence is sometimes great, and
that may pose considerable problems for originalism. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130
S. Ct. 3020 (2010), for example, eight Justices rejected an argument that the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause made the
protections of the first eight amendments enforceable against the states, in significant part
because of uncertainty about the Clause’s original meaning. See id. at 3030 (plurality
opinion); id. at 3089 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 3132–33 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Four of
the five Justices who supported incorporation of the Second Amendment within the
Fourteenth relied on the Due Process Clause without any claim that incorporation was
consistent with the original meaning of that clause. See id. at 3030–31, 3050 (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“[N]either [the plurality nor the dissents] argues that the meaning they attribute
to the Due Process Clause was consistent with public understanding at the time of its
ratification.”). Indeed, in terms of original public meaning, incorporation of the first eight
amendments within the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause makes little sense
because it renders the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process Clauses redundant.
See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63–66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). For an
analysis of this issue by a leading originalist who concedes that nonoriginalist construction
may be required to determine if the Fourteenth Amendment makes the first eight
amendments applicable to the states, see Solum, supra note 26, at 419–45.
52. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1631, 1644–51 (2009); Tribe, supra note 23, at 87–91.
53. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. Weems, 217 U.S. at 362–65.
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punishment imposed under the Stuart kings of England that had come to be
regarded as excessive.56 Even though the cadena temporal did not resemble any of
these punishments, the Court nevertheless concluded that it violated the Eighth
Amendment in light of the imbalance between the severity of the punishment and
the gravity of the offense.57
It is hard not to sympathize with Weems; if the Eighth Amendment prohibited
only those punishments labeled as cruel and unusual in the framing era, the
Constitution would offer no protection against the creation of new punishments that
produce chilling pain and terror in novel ways. This seems an untenable approach
to a textual prohibition framed at a level of considerable generality. Even Justice
Scalia concedes that the Eighth Amendment states “an abstract principle,” and for
that reason applies “to all sorts of tortures quite unknown at the time the Eighth
Amendment was adopted.”58 He also appears to accept the holding of Weems.59
A similar problem arose in Clinton v. Jones60 when the Court considered
whether the Constitution’s delegation of executive power to the president meant
that a sitting president could not be compelled to face trial in a civil action arising
out of conduct occurring before he took office, because such a trial could impede
the president in the discharge of his constitutional duties. The Court observed that
no remotely comparable issue arose during the framing era; therefore, the Court
concluded that historical inquiry shed no light on the issue.61 And, in Boumediene
v. Bush,62 the Court declined to rely on framing-era practice to determine whether
the constitutional right to challenge the legality of one’s detention by writ of habeas
corpus applied to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba—where Cuba technically

56. Id. at 371–72.
57. Id. at 377–82. The Court also advanced a classic argument against reliance on
original expected applications:
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true, from an
experience of evils, but its general language should not, therefore, be
necessarily confined to the form that evil had theretofore taken. Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore a
principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief
which gave it birth. This is peculiarly true of constitutions. They are not
ephemeral enactments, designed to meet passing occasions. They are, to use the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, “designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it.” The future is their care and provision for
events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made. In the
application of a constitution, therefore, our contemplation cannot be only of
what has been but of what may be. Under any other rule a constitution would
indeed be as easy of application as it would be deficient in efficacy and power.
Its general principles would have little value and be converted by precedent into
impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights declared in words might be lost in
reality.
Id. at 373.
58. Scalia, supra note 14, at 145 (emphasis in original).
59. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 990–92 (1991) (plurality opinion).
60. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
61. Id. at 695–97.
62. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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retains sovereignty but the United States exercises complete control under a
perpetual lease—since there was no analogous framing-era practice and the
relevant historical record was incomplete.63
Thus, an approach to constitutional interpretation that depends on framing-era
practices and understandings to flesh out the original meaning of the Constitution’s
vague or ambiguous provisions is of no aid when facing problems that did not arise
in the framing era. But beyond this deficiency, there is the problem of changed
circumstances.
2. Original-Expected-Applications Originalism and Changed Circumstances
An even more serious problem with a reliance on original expected applications
to guide the interpretation of vague or ambiguous constitutional text is that
framing-era understandings and practice may be irrelevant to contemporary
circumstances. This point was central to Brown; in light of the changes in
importance of public education since the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court concluded that in assessing the constitutionality of racial segregation
under the Equal Protection clause: “We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.”64 The problem, however, is not confined to matters of racial
discrimination. Consider Justice White’s Fourth Amendment originalism.
Justice White was no foe of using framing-era practices and understandings to
illustrate the meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures; for example, he authored the opinion of the Court in United
States v. Watson,65 in which the Court relied on the framing-era law of arrest as it
held that the Fourth Amendment permits warrantless arrests on probable cause to
believe that the arrestee had committed a felony.66 Yet, in Tennessee v. Garner,67
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court invalidating a state statute codifying
the framing-era rule that deadly force could be used to stop a fleeing felon,
concluding: “Because of sweeping change in the legal and technological context,
reliance on the common-law rule in this case would be a mistaken literalism that
ignores the purposes of a historical inquiry.”68 The framing-era rule, Justice White
reasoned, was a consequence of “the relative dangerousness of felons,” as well as
the fact that “virtually all felonies were punishable by death,” but since then, most
felonies had become noncapital offenses and many nondangerous offenses had

63. Id. at 746–52.
64. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
65. 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
66. Id. at 418–23. Justice White’s commitment to framing-era practice as illuminating
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment was not ephemeral; he later dissented from the
Court’s holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant to make a forcible entry into
an arrestee’s home for purpose of effecting an arrest, on the ground that this holding was
unsupported by framing-era practice. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 604–14 (1980)
(White, J., dissenting).
67. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
68. Id. at 13.
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become classified as felonies.69 “These changes have undermined the
concept . . . that use of deadly force against a fleeing felon is merely a speedier
execution of someone who has already forfeited his life. They have also made the
assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a misdemeanant untenable.”70
Moreover, arrests were more dangerous affairs in the framing era, “when weapons
were rudimentary.”71 Accordingly, “though the common-law pedigree of
Tennessee’s rule is pure on its face, changes in the legal and technological context
mean the rule is distorted almost beyond recognition when literally applied.”72
Thus, Justice White believed that the framing-era judgment about the
reasonableness of using deadly force against a fleeing felon was based on a
framing-era context no longer relevant.73
One of the most potent charges against originalism is that it “depends on using
history without historicism, the use of evidence from the past without paying
attention to historical context.”74 As Garner illustrates, strong original-expectedapplications originalism is particularly vulnerable to this charge: changed
circumstances may undermine the relevance of framing-era understandings or
practice to contemporary circumstances.75 To be sure, some constitutional text
seems to codify framing-era practice. The Seventh Amendment, for example,
provides: “In Suits at common law . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved,
and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”76 This formulation

69. Id. at 13–14 (footnote omitted).
70. Id. at 14.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 15.
73. Even the dissenters would not embrace framing-era practice without regard to
changed circumstances, although they afforded it greater weight:
Although the Court has recognized that the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment must respond to the reality of social and technological change,
fidelity to the notion of constitutional—as opposed to purely judicial—limits on
governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those who claim
that practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted are now
constitutionally impermissible.
Id. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
74. Stephen M. Griffin, Rebooting Originalism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1185, 1188.
75. Indeed, Professor Davies has argued that the framers’ focus on general warrants was
itself a product of contemporary circumstances; in particular, the considerable evidence that
the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment as limited to a prohibition on general
warrants was a consequence of the fact that general warrants were understood as the only
abuse of power likely to emerge from the federal government. See Davies, supra note 29, at
619–68. He concludes:
Applying the original meaning of the language of the Fourth Amendment in a
completely changed social and institutional context would subvert the purpose
the Framers had in mind when they adopted the text. They focused on banning
general warrants because they perceived the general warrant as the only means
by which discretionary search authority might be conferred.
Id. at 740–41 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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seems to constitutionalize framing-era jury rights, and the Court has therefore
turned to framing-era practice as the basis for interpreting this constitutional
guarantee.77 But, as we have seen, nonoriginalists claim the open-ended provisions
of the Constitution as their own—those most readily characterized as vague or
ambiguous—and it is far from clear that framing-era practice supplies a reliable
guide to their original meaning in light of changed circumstances. Christopher
Eisgruber has made the point this way:
Suppose that Grandpa is on his deathbed, and he whispers to Sonny,
“Just promise me this Sonny: eat only healthy food.” Sonny, eager to
grant this modest request, makes the promise. Grandpa dies,
confidently believing (as Sonny well knows) that raw fish and red wine
are bad for you and that whole milk is good for you. Now suppose
Sonny becomes convinced, on the basis of subsequent scientific
studies, that sushi and Chianti are part of a healthy diet but that whole
milk is not. We can argue, I suppose, about whether Sonny, if he
wishes to honor his promise, should eat or refuse sushi. But we should
in any case be able to agree that the concept “healthy” does not become
meaningless if divorced from Grandpa’s outdated beliefs about what is
healthy. If Sonny decides to eat sushi, he will still be acting on the basis
of a promise to eat healthy food.78
Indeed, slavish adherence to framing-era practices and understandings without
inquiry into changed circumstances puts one in mind of Holmes’s famous axiom:
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it
was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.”79 There is surely a powerful argument that when the
constitutional text does not expressly codify a framing-era rule, but rather states a
more general standard, the standard should be applied in light of contemporary
understandings rather than framing-era conceptions that may be outmoded or

77. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687,
708 (1999); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–52 (1998);
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996); Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 533–34 (1970). For contrasting views of the original meaning of the Seventh
Amendment, see, for example, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 89–93 (1998) (Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury in federal court only
when a jury is available in state court); Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of
the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 479–83 (1999)
(Seventh Amendment leaves federal jury rights to congressional discretion); and Rachael E.
Schwartz, “Everything Depends on How You Draw the Lines”: An Alternative Interpretation
of the Seventh Amendment, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 599, 616–29 (1996) (same).
78. EISGRUBER, supra note 17, at 29. For similar discussions, see, for example, RONALD
DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 291–94
(1996); and Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1170–71
(1993).
79. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897).
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irrelevant.80 There is even an originalist argument in support of this conclusion; as
Lee Strang, a committed originalist, has written: “A reasonable person in the
position of the Framers and Ratifiers would ‘draw their Constitution loosely
enough so that it might live and breathe and change with time.’”81 Thus, there is
reason to believe that the problem of changed circumstances is a serious one for
original-expected-applications originalism.
Even Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence acknowledges this flaw in
original-expected-applications originalism. As we have seen, Justice Scalia
professes adherence to original-expected-applications originalism; in particular,
reliance on original expected applications is evident in his Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. For example, he wrote the opinion of the Court in Wyoming v.
Houghton,82 which contains a paradigmatic reliance on original expected
applications: “In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this
provision, we inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed.”83 Yet Justice
Scalia, like Justice White, acknowledges the need to retreat from original expected
applications in the face of changed circumstances. Consider Kyllo v. United
States.84
In the framing era, only a physical trespass was thought to be an unlawful
invasion of the privacy of the home, and for that reason, in its first encounter with
electronic surveillance, the Court held that wiretapping unaccompanied by a
physical trespass to the home was not a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.85 As Justice Scalia observed, “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was
tied to common-law trespass.”86 Nevertheless, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia wrote the
opinion of the Court holding that the use of a thermal imaging device that, although
positioned on public property outside of a home, discloses “the relative heat of
various rooms in the home,”87 amounts to a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment:
[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical
and hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy—there is

80. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 10–16, 75–81; Dorf, supra note 23, at 1804–10;
Mark D. Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569,
591–617 (1998).
81. Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”: Abduced-Principle
Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently Accommodates
Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927, 952 (2009) (quoting FOREST MCDONALD,
NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 293 (1985)). To
similar effect, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings
Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 857–58 (1995).
82. 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
83. Id. at 299. To similar effect, see, for example, Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 168
(2008) (Scalia, J.).
84. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–66 (1928), overruled by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
86. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
87. Id. at 35 n.2.
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a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be
reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed
by the Fourth Amendment. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search—at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.88
Thus, advancing technology constituted a changed circumstance that required a
departure from the framing-era understanding that an unlawful invasion of the
security of the home required a physical trespass. Accordingly, even Justice Scalia
is prepared to reject strong original-expected-applications originalism based on
changed circumstances. The same is true of the Court’s other professed originalist.
Although Justice Thomas has never advanced a fully developed theory of
constitutional interpretation, he also claims fealty to originalism.89 Yet he joined
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Kyllo.
Also consider Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton.90 Justice Scalia’s opinion
for the Court, addressing the constitutionality of random drug testing of high school
athletes, first acknowledged that a mandatory urine test “constitutes a ‘search’
subject to the demands of the Fourth Amendment,”91 and then stated,
[I]n a case such as this, where there was no clear practice, either
approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets
the reasonableness standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of
legitimate governmental interests.”92
Applying that test, the Court upheld mandatory urinalysis of students engaged in
interscholastic sports.93
As it happens, however, there were at least two candidates for a pertinent
framing-era practice in Acton. On the one hand, the general framing-era rule was
that searches of individuals were permitted only if incident to a valid arrest. As
William Cuddihy concluded in his exhaustive analysis of the historical evidence,
“by 1789, body searches were derivatives of the arrest process, and Americans had
little recent experience with personal searches apart from that process.”94 A
warrantless misdemeanor arrest was improper if the offense had not been
committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or the arrestee was not

88. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
89. See, e.g., Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996).
90. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
91. Id. at 652.
92. Id. at 652–53 (footnote omitted) (quoting Skinner v. Railway Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n,
489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)).
93. Id. at 665–66.
94. CUDDIHY, supra note 29, at 752.
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actually guilty of the offense, and a warrantless felony arrest was not permitted
unless a felony had in fact been committed and there was reasonable grounds to
believe that the arrestee had committed the offense.95 Indeed, just a few years
before Acton, Justice Scalia had acknowledged the framing-era impropriety of a
search of a person absent a basis to make an arrest.96 Under this framing-era rule,
the random drug tests at issue in Acton would be readily condemned. On the other
hand, Justice Thomas, while joining Justice Scalia’s opinion in Acton, in a
subsequent case contended that the framing-era rule of in loco parentis, which
afforded public schools virtually unfettered power over children in their charge,
supports a rule granting equally broad discretion to contemporary public schools
with respect to the search and seizure of students.97
Strikingly, in Acton, Justice Scalia applied neither of these framing-era rules.
His opinion of the Court makes no express comment on the framing-era law of
arrest, but it observes that outside of the context of a search “undertaken by law
enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing,” the Court had
held that searches unsupported by probable cause are thought constitutionally
reasonable “‘when special needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”98 As for the
framing-era conception of in loco parentis, Justice Scalia observed that compulsory
school attendance laws were uncommon in the framing era.99 The implication, of
course, is the framing-era concept of in loco parentis involved a voluntary
delegation of parental authority to school officials, but the notion that parents
voluntarily delegate their authority to public school officials in the contemporary
regime of compulsory school attendance is doubtful at best.100 Thus, Justice Scalia
found the analogy to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentis instructive but
incomplete, and relied on the doctrine only to the extent that it illuminated the
nature of a student’s privacy interests under a nonoriginalist balancing test.101

95. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418–21 (1976); Thomas Y. Davies,
The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions
and Evasions in Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 239, 323–24 (2002).
96. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 380–81 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
97. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2655–56 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2751–59 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
framing-era practice recognizing broad parental authority means that merchants have no
First Amendment right to communicate with children except through their parents).
98. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
99. Id. at 652 n.1.
100. Cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“It is a
dangerous fiction to pretend that parents simply delegate their authority . . . to public school
authorities. It is even more dangerous to assume that such a delegation of authority somehow
strips public school authorities of their status as agents of the State. Most parents,
realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability to
influence what occurs in the school.”).
101. Acton, 515 U.S. at 655–56. Similarly, in his opinion of the Court rejecting Justice
Thomas’s analogy to the broad scope of framing-era parental authority when assessing the
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Accordingly, changes from the historical context in which both of the potentially
applicable framing-era rules evolved led Justice Scalia to regard neither as
dispositive. Indeed, a consistent theme in Justice Scalia’s Fourth Amendment
originalism is his willingness to depart from framing-era rules on the basis of a
pertinent change in circumstances.102
Justice Scalia’s willingness to depart from framing-era practice is not limited to
the Fourth Amendment. For example, writing for a three-justice plurality in
Burnham v. Superior Court,103 Justice Scalia embraced the framing-era rule that
personal jurisdiction could be exercised whenever a defendant was physically
served in the forum state consistent with due process,104 but also defended the more
recent emergence of jurisdictional doctrine that permits absent defendants to be
haled into a forum state as a necessary response to “changes in the technology of
transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of interstate
business activity.”105 Thus, in his view, the Due Process Clause did not freeze
framing-era jurisdictional practice in place; such an approach, he acknowledged,
“would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and to render it incapable of
progress or improvement.”106
Similarly, in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of
Environmental Protection,107 in response to Justice Kennedy’s observation that in
the framing era a “taking” of property within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on taking of public property without the payment of just
compensation was understood to refer to physical appropriation of property through
a legislature’s exercise of the power of eminent domain,108 Justice Scalia’s opinion
for a four-justice plurality (including Justice Thomas) took the position that a
“taking” within the meaning of the Takings Clause nevertheless could be
accomplished by a judicial decision that radically altered property rights,
explaining that “the Framers did not envision the Takings Clause would apply to
judicial action” only because “the Constitution was adopted in an era when courts
had no power to ‘change’ the common law.”109 Thus, what Justice Scalia regarded
as a pertinent change in the applicable legal context warranted adoption of an
First Amendment rights of minors, Justice Scalia refused to rely on that framing-era practice
because it involved legal recognition of the scope of parental authority rather than direct
governmental restrictions on the ability of minors to obtain material otherwise protected by
the First Amendment. See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2736 n.3.
102. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 382 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(observing that since the framing era “concealed weapons capable of harming the
interrogator quickly and from beyond arm’s reach have become common—which might alter
the judgment of what is ‘reasonable’ under the original standard”); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 583 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[I]t may even be that changes in the
surrounding legal rules (for example, elimination of the common-law rule that reasonable,
good-faith belief was no defense to absolute liability for trespass . . .), may make a warrant
indispensable to reasonableness where it once was not.” (citations omitted)).
103. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
104. Id. at 616–19.
105. Id. at 617.
106. Id. at 619 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 529 (1884)).
107. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
108. Id. at 2616 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
109. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion).
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understanding of the concept of a “taking” unsupported by framing-era practice. In
Citizens United v. FEC,110 responding to an argument that framing-era practice did
not support granting corporations First Amendment rights because corporations
were regarded as subject to plenary regulation in the framing era,111 Justice Scalia
wrote: “Most of the Founders’ resentment towards corporations was directed at the
state-granted monopoly privileges that individually chartered corporations enjoyed.
Modern corporations do not have such privileges . . . .”112 Once again, Justice
Scalia acknowledged that framing-era practice can be discounted if it is regarded as
dependent on the historical context in which it developed. In addition, we have seen
that Justice Scalia is willing to depart from framing-era practice when it comes to
racial segregation.113 We will see other examples of Justice Scalia’s willingness to
depart from framing-era practice in Part III below.
As for the Court’s other professed originalist, while Justice Thomas may more
often be faithful to original expected applications than Justice Scalia, he is also
willing to depart from framing-era practice on what he regards as sufficient
justification. For example, in addition to joining Justice Scalia’s discussions of the
need to move beyond framing-era practice in Kyllo, Stop the Beach Renourishment,
and Citizens United, Justice Thomas has written that the Fourteenth Amendment, in
his view, prohibits the government from making any use of race in decision
making.114 Yet, as we have seen, this view has little support in framing-era
practice.115 Nor has Justice Thomas articulated any originalist basis rooted in
historical evidence of original meaning for identifying what should be regarded as a
sufficient basis to depart from framing-era practice.
To be sure, as we have seen, there are occasions on which Justices Scalia and
Thomas find framing-era practice controlling. The key point is not that on some
occasions these Justices have departed from original expected applications, but
rather that even they acknowledge that framing-era practice and understandings
cannot be uncritically applied to contemporary circumstances that may render
framing-era judgments obsolete or irrelevant. Once one has the option to depart
from framing-era rules if there is adequate justification for doing so, however,
strong original-expected-applications originalism supplies no reliable originalist
technique for interpreting vague or ambiguous constitutional text. When many
years have passed between the framing and the occasion for constitutional
adjudication, any advocate with even a modicum of creativity will generally be able
to identify some sort of changed circumstance. Yet strong original-expectedapplications originalism offers no originalist methodology for evaluating claims
based on changed circumstances. Consequently, in the face of a claim of changed

110. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
111. Id. at 948–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 39–48.
114. E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 751–
52 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
115. See supra text accompanying note 40. For a useful analysis of Justice Thomas’s
originalism that notes the difference in his approach to questions involving race and other
issues, see SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CLARENCE
THOMAS 193–94 (1999).
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circumstances, this brand of originalism necessarily devolves into a nonoriginalist
debate on the significance and meaning of the proffered claim of changed
circumstances.116 An originalism that treats framing-era practices and
understandings as inevitably dispositive, in contrast, can be the touchstone for
constitutional interpretation only if one is willing to ignore Holmes’s admonition
and rely on history even when the rationale for historical practice is later
undermined by changed circumstances.
In short, the same sort of changed circumstances that nonoriginalists claim offer
support for ascribing evolving content to the Constitution cause strong originalexpected-applications originalism to collapse. As a result, strong original-expectedapplications originalism cannot in practice be distinguished from nonoriginalism
unless there is a genuinely originalist interpretative technique available for
determining when framing-era practices and understandings should be rejected as
outmoded. While strong original-expected-applications originalism offers no such
technique, a weaker form of original-expected-applications originalism capable of
accommodating changed circumstances has endeavored to come to grips with this
problem.
B. Weak Original-Expected-Applications Originalism
One might agree that in a strong form in which framing-era practices and
understandings are treated as interpretively binding, original-expected-applications
originalism is untenable; but in a weaker form, it could still be of value as a starting
point for constitutional interpretation. Such an originalism could, for example,
place a burden of justification on those who advocate a departure from the framingera baseline.117
1. Weak Original-Expected-Applications Originalism and Nonoriginalism
It is questionable whether, in practice, weak original-expected-applications
originalism is any different from nonoriginalism. As we have seen, originalism
requires that the meaning of constitutional text be fixed at the framing.118 An
originalism that uses framing-era understandings to flesh out vague or ambiguous
constitutional text, but permits departure from framing-era understandings on what
is regarded as adequate justification, seems to blur into nonoriginalism. Indeed,
nonoriginalist adjudication often takes the same form as weak original-expectedapplications originalism.
In its famously nonoriginalist decision in Brown v. Board of Education, for
example, the Court began its discussion with framing-era practice and proceeded to
explain that changed circumstances made reference to framing-era practice

116. For a helpful albeit largely theoretical discussion of how the problem that changed
circumstances present for originalism becomes more acute over time, see Samaha, supra
note 19, at 1344–46.
117. For an argument along these lines, see Note, Original Meaning and Its Limits, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1279, 1292–1300 (2007).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 1–9.
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inappropriate.119 The same pattern is evident in most of the nonoriginalist decisions
of the Court. When the Court held that the Eighth Amendment imposes limitations
on capital punishment in Furman v. Georgia,120 two Justices wrote strikingly
nonoriginalist opinions in which they concluded that capital punishment had
become inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment, but even these opinions started
with framing-era practice and understandings, only to conclude that evolving social
norms warranted a departure from the framing-era understanding.121 Similarly,
when the Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion under the Due Process
Clause in Roe v. Wade,122 it engaged in a lengthy inquiry into the history of
abortion regulation up to and beyond the framing era,123 concluding that advances
in medical technology had made obsolete many of the judgments that had
traditionally underlain abortion regulation in the framing era.124 The Court then
held that the only remaining and still-pertinent state interest in protecting human
life was inadequate to sustain a prohibition on abortion prior to viability.125 More
recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,126 in the course of invalidating a statutory
prohibition on same-sex sodomy in private among consenting adults under the Due
Process Clause, the Court canvassed framing-era practice, only to question its
significance given that framing-era statutes were not directed at homosexual
conduct and were rarely enforced with respect to private conduct.127 The Court then
embraced a nonoriginalist approach to due process in light of the broad terms of the
constitutional text and the inability of the framers to anticipate social evolution.128
Whether one condemns or approves of these decisions, it should be plain that a
methodology requiring some justification for a departure from framing-era practice
when interpreting the Constitution is not unique to originalism; nor is it anything
close to a guarantee that adjudication will be based on a historically fixed meaning
of constitutional text. Once one agrees that framing-era practices and
understandings are not conclusive, pretty much everything is fair game. Moreover,
in such a jurisprudence, adjudication does not turn on historically fixed original
meaning, but instead on a nonoriginalist evaluation of the arguments for departure
from the framing-era understanding of vague or ambiguous constitutional text.

119. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489–93 (1954).
120. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
121. See id. at 258–306 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 333–69 (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
122. 410 U.S. 113 (1973), modified, Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
123. Id. at 129–52.
124. Id. at 147–50.
125. Id. at 162–64.
126. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
127. Id. at 568–71, 578–79.
128. Id. at 578–79 (“Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have
this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater
freedom.”).
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2. Translating Original Expected Applications
To illustrate the difficulty of distinguishing weak original-expected-applications
originalism from nonoriginalism, consider the approach of perhaps its most
prominent academic advocate, Lawrence Lessig, who contends that the
presuppositions underlying framing-era practices and understandings must be
identified and then “translated” in light of contemporary understandings and
circumstances.129 Under this approach, one does not have to work very hard to
repudiate an original expected application. When centuries have passed between
the framing of constitutional text and the time that a court is required to interpret it,
a good deal will have changed, and virtually any argument asserting that framingera practices or understandings based on a now-obsolete presupposition can be
sufficient, under Professor Lessig’s methodology, to justify a repudiation of
framing-era practice.
For example, Professor Lessig defends the famously nonoriginalist decision
utilizing the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelling any person to be a
witness against himself to regulate custodial police interrogation in Miranda v.
Arizona,130 arguing that although framing-era interrogation of criminal suspects
was a part of the judicial process, once modern police forces undertook custodial
interrogation, the framing-era presupposition that only the judicial process need be
regulated in order to protect the right against compelled self-incrimination became
obsolete.131 He justifies the New Deal-era expansion in the scope of congressional
power to regulate interstate commerce on the ground that the framing-era
supposition that only a limited set of transactions need be regulated in order to
protect the flow of interstate commerce had been made obsolete by an emerging
understanding that a much broader realm of activity could have an impact on the
national economy.132 He similarly argues that framing-era suppositions about the
character of discrimination that was thought sufficiently odious to offend the Equal
Protection Clause have gradually expanded to include all forms of race
discrimination, as well as discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy, sex, and,
eventually, he predicts, sexual orientation as well.133
As these examples should demonstrate, once one starts playing the translation
game, it is pretty easy to gin up some excuse for setting framing-era practices and
understandings aside. As Professor Lessig’s critics note, it will almost always be
possible to identify some arguably relevant supposition that has changed since the
framing era.134 Moreover, once such an argument against framing-era practice is

129. See Lessig, supra note 42, at 401–14; Lessig, supra note 78, at 1174–211; Lawrence
Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131–35.
130. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
131. See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1233–37.
132. See Lessig, supra note 42, at 453–72.
133. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1419–29
(1997).
134. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and
the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357,
370–75 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995); Friedman & Smith, supra note 9, at 31; Klarman, supra
note 17, at 394–412. An inquiry this freewheeling, one could add, injects a considerable risk
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offered, it can be rejected only based on a nonoriginalist evaluation of the relevance
of framing-era suppositions to contemporary circumstances. For his part, Lessig
offers only two constraints imposed by his brand of original-expected-applications
originalism—a changed reading of constitutional text cannot be based on a fact or
belief that would have produced a different text in the first instance, nor can a
changed reading transgress the institutional limitations on the judiciary to assess
complex factual or policy issues or deeply contested ethical concepts.135 It is hard
to identify any nonoriginalist decision that offends the first limitation; as we have
seen, nonoriginalists rely only on the type of vague or open-ended texts that
accommodate evolving content. As for the second, Professor Lessig does not claim
that this principle has any originalist justification; he identifies no historical
evidence that this type of prudential concern was a part of the original meaning of
any portion of the Constitution. Indeed, as we will see below, even when assessed
in terms of original meaning, there is no constitutional text that requires the
judiciary to defer to legislative policy or ethical choices. Nor is Lessig’s second
principle distinguishable from nonoriginalism. There is no necessary inconsistency
between nonoriginalism and a prudent concern for the limited institutional
capabilities of the judiciary.
The examples canvassed above in which Justice Scalia departed from framingera practice reflect the inability to articulate an originalist methodology for
adapting, or “translating,” framing-era practice to contemporary circumstances. In
Kyllo, for example, Justices Scalia and Thomas were willing to depart from the
framing-era rule that required a physical trespass to constitute an invasion of a
legally protected interest in the privacy of the home to prevent what they regarded
as an erosion of constitutional protection as a consequence of technological
advance.136 Yet the framing-era requirement of a physical trespass necessarily
enabled the trespasser—by utilizing all five senses from within the home—to learn
a great deal more than can be revealed through a thermal image. Moreover, as thenProfessor Posner once observed, a trespassory search and seizure involves healthy
doses of force and coercion absent in electronic surveillance, of which the target is
usually unaware.137 Thus, although, in Kyllo, Justice Scalia wrote that the Court’s
holding “assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,”138 we have no way of knowing
whether, in the framing era, the limited intrusion on the home accomplished by a
thermal imager would have been regarded an invasion of an interest too ephemeral

of error into adjudication. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written
Constitution: A Comment on Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1435, 1436–38 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions,
101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 941–44 (2003).
135. See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1251–63.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 84–89. For a recent explication of Kyllo as
reflecting an effort to maintain the framing-era equilibrium between security and order, see
Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 496–99 (2011).
137. See Richard A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court,
1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173, 185–88.
138. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
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to merit legal protection—the argument that Justice Stevens advanced in dissent.139
The Court’s holding in Kyllo may be correct, but not based on the historical
evidence that framing-era practice is properly “translated” to jettison the
requirement of a physical trespass when a technological “trespass” by thermal
image compromises the privacy of the home to a far lesser extent than a framingera physical trespass. It may be normatively desirable to recognize Fourth
Amendment protection for every aspect of the home that would have been free
from official scrutiny in the framing era absent a physical trespass, but such a
conclusion is again driven purely by a nonoriginalist concern with technological
erosion of privacy, not the framing-era conception of a legally protected interest in
the privacy of the home, which required a far greater intrusion on privacy than is
accomplished by thermal imaging. Indeed, even Professor Lessig has
acknowledged that the framers never “worked out what the amendment would
protect in a world where perfectly noninvasive searches could be
conducted. . . . [W]e need to make that choice.”140
The same problem appears in Acton. We have no way of knowing how the
framing-era practice that forbade search and seizure absent a basis to make an
arrest, or the framing-era conception of school officials acting in loco parentis, is
properly applied to searches of students at public schools. As we have seen,
translating either the framing-era law of arrest or the framing-era conception of in
loco parentis to the context of the contemporary public-school searches is perilous;
neither is precisely analogous to the contemporary public school.141 Whatever
conclusion one draws, moreover, will not be based on the historically fixed
meaning of constitutional text, but instead will be based on a nonoriginalist
assessment of the significance of changed circumstances. Thus, Acton, like Kyllo,
presents all the dangers of counterfactual historical analysis. Given the difficulties
in translating framing-era practice to public schools operating under compulsory
school attendance laws, historical evidence can supply no reliable basis for
adjudication.
More recently, in United States v. Jones,142 in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court held that attaching a GPS device to a vehicle and its subsequent use to
monitor the movements of a vehicle was a “search” within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment; relying on the framing-era rule that “no man can set his foot
upon his neighbour’s close without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser,”143
Justice Scalia reasoned that to “‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy
against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted,’”144 the
Fourth Amendment should be “understood to embody a particular concern for
government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it
enumerates.”145 Yet, although Justice Scalia invoked the framing-era conception of
trespass to support the Court’s holding, it is doubtful that we can fairly equate the

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 41–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 149–50 (1999).
See supra text accompanying notes 90–101.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 949 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (C.P. 1765)).
Id. at 950 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (brackets in original)).
Id.
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attachment and monitoring of a GPS device to anything that arose in the framingera law of trespass. As Justice Alito noted in his separate opinion, “it is almost
impossible to think of late-18th-century situations that are analogous to what took
place in this case,” such as “a case in which a constable secreted himself
somewhere in a coach and remained there for a period of time in order to monitor
the movements of the coach’s owner,” and, he added, “this would have required
either a gigantic coach, a very tiny constable, or both.”146 Even in such a
hypothetical, however, by using all his senses, the constable would have learned
more than the limited information transmitted by a GPS device, and he could not
have simultaneously informed his colleagues of his location in the manner that a
GPS device instantaneously transmits data. Indeed, Justice Scalia ultimately
disclaimed reliance on framing-era practice, writing: “[I]t is quite irrelevant
whether there was an 18th-century analog.”147 Accordingly, Justice Scalia
effectively acknowledged that the Court’s holding was not simply an exercise in
translating original expected applications.
Thus, a jurisprudence that relies on original expected applications to decide
cases involving significantly different circumstances cannot claim to be doing no
more than applying original expected applications; a judgment is required as to
whether the change in circumstances warrants a departure from original expected
applications. Yet, a jurisprudence that permits departure from framing-era
understandings and practice as long as someone can think of a good reason for
doing so means that adjudication is ultimately based not on historical evidence of
original meaning, but rather on a nonoriginalist consideration of whether framingera practices and understandings have become obsolete. This, of course, is the
essence of nonoriginalism, which ascribes evolving content to vague or ambiguous
constitutional text. If departures from framing-era practice are to be permitted by
originalism, then there must be a distinctively originalist methodology for assessing
the propriety of such departures. In its actual practice, original-expectedapplications originalism fails this challenge. Semantic originalism, in contrast,
claims to offer an originalism that can accommodate the challenge of changed
circumstances.
II. SEMANTIC ORIGINALISM
Most originalists draw a distinction between the original meaning of
constitutional text and its originally intended applications, arguing that only the
former is interpretively binding.148 Michael McConnell has even claimed that “no

146. Id. at 958 & n.3 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
147. Id. at 950 n.3.
148. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 6–14; Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles,
24 CONST. COMMENT. 405, 410 (2007); Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism and Its Discontents
(Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 CONST. COMMENT. 383, 385–89 (2007); Steven
G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 663, 668–72 (2009); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 14, at 115, 119; Christopher R. Green,
Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 555, 580–82 (2006);
McConnell, supra note 11, at 1284–87; Paulsen, supra note 11, at 2059–62; Rotunda, supra
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reputable originalist . . . takes the view that the Framers’ ‘assumptions and
expectation about the correct application’ of their principles is
controlling. . . . Mainstream originalists recognize that the Framers’ analysis of
particular applications could be wrong, or that circumstances could have changed
and made them wrong.”149 Even Justice Scalia agrees that what is binding is
“semantic intention” and not “the concrete expectations of lawgivers.”150 Thus, a
semantic form of originalism is the predominant approach, in which constitutional
interpretation is not based on the intentions of the framers or the original expected
applications of constitutional text, but rather on the original meaning of the text
stated at the level of generality found in the text.151 Semantic originalism, by
evading the problems said to pervade reliance on the original intentions of the
framers popular among the previous generation of originalists, is sometimes
referred to as the “New Originalism.”152
The problems with this account emerge when semantic originalism is applied to
the open-ended constitutional text that nonoriginalists claim as their domain. The
original meaning of such text may be so indeterminate or stated at such a high level
of generality that semantic originalism may be effectively indistinguishable from
nonoriginalism.153 Consider again the Fourth Amendment.
In Jones, after the Court asserted that it “[wa]s quite irrelevant whether there
was an 18th-century analog” to the installation and use of a GPS device, the Court
added: “Whatever new methods of investigation may be devised, our task, at a
minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constituted a
‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”154 This sounds
like semantic originalism but, in Jones, the Court offered no semantic evidence of
“the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment”; instead, it relied solely on
framing-era tort law which, of course, even the Court acknowledged did not
address anything fairly analogous to the installation and use of a GPS device.
Indeed, semantic originalism seems to offer little help in a case like Jones since, as
we have seen, the original semantic meaning of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition on unreasonable search and seizures was so expansive—search or
seizure was considered unreasonable either if it was deemed illegal or contrary to
note 11, at 513–14; Solum, supra note 26, at 411–12.
149. McConnell, supra note 11, at 1284 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150. Scalia, supra note 33, at 144.
151. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 11, at 14–16; BORK, supra note 14, at 144–51;
DWORKIN, supra note 78, at 291–92; Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549, 557–60 (2009); Barnett, supra note 148, at 410–16;
Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 668–72; Aileen Kavanagh, Original Intention, Enacted
Text, and Constitutional Interpretation, 47 AM. J. JURIS. 255, 271–79 (2002); James E. Ryan,
Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523,
1538–42 (2011); Solum, supra note 26, at 411–15; Strang, supra note 81, at 972–80.
152. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12, at 620–29; Solum, supra note 5, at 22–24;
Whittington, supra note 5, at 559–611. Some, however, claim that there is in reality little
difference between semantic originalism and the brand of original-intention originalism
popular in the 1970s and 1980s. See, e.g., O’NEILL, supra note 12, at 127–32; Steven D.
Smith, That Old-Time Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM, supra note 5, at
223, 234–36.
153. See Smith, supra note 23, at 721–24.
154. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012) (emphasis in original).
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sound judgment.155 Both formulations offer little more than a legal conclusion,
however, and once original expected applications are rejected as the basis for
assessing either illegality or sound judgment, the original semantic meaning
offered by the Fourth Amendment’s text seems so capacious that it produces an
approach to constitutional interpretation little different from nonoriginalism.156
The holding in Jones is likely defensible if one thinks that technological advance
may not erode legal protections against any form of official scrutiny, but this is a
nonoriginalist claim—it is not an original expected application, nor is it premised
on any historical evidence about the original semantic meaning of the prohibition
on “unreasonable search and seizure” divorced from original expected applications.
Richard Kay, himself an advocate of relying on the framers’ intentions to
determine original meaning, has suggested that once original expected applications
of constitutional text are cast aside, original meaning is likely to be so
indeterminate that originalism will no longer be of much use in constitutional
adjudication.157 There is surely something to Professor Kay’s point. If the original
expected applications of constitutional text are irrelevant, and if the original
meaning of the more open-ended constitutional text on which nonoriginalists rely
can only be defined at a high level of generality, unhelpful to the resolution of most
constitutional disputes, it may be that semantic originalism will prove effectively
useless. For example, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman advocate a semantic
originalism based not on what they call “historically concrete understandings”;
instead they “conceive of the inquiry in hypothetical terms: What would a fullyinformed public audience, in possession of all relevant information about the
Constitution and the world around it, have understood the Constitution to mean?”158
Other semantic originalists place greater weight on the framing-era public’s
understanding of the Constitution’s text.159 In either guise, these formulations may

155. See supra text accompanying notes 30–31.
156. See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1743–47 (1996); Tracey Maclin, Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the
Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895,
966–72 (2002); Sklansky, supra note 31, at 1807–13.
157. See Richard S. Kay, Original Intention and Original Public Meaning in
Constitutional Interpretation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 703, 719–25 (2009). For the expression of
a similar view, see Smith, supra note 152, at 239–42.
158. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 25 (2001). For an elaboration, see Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman,
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
159. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12, at 621 (“the objective original meaning that a
reasonable listener would place on the words used in the constitutional provision at the time
of its enactment”); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy of Particular Conceptions of
Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 677 (1991) (“a constitutional provision’s
‘objective meaning’ to the public at the time the provision was ratified” (emphasis omitted)).
Indeed, some semantic originalists go as far as contending that in assessing original
meaning, substantial weight should be afforded to longstanding or framing-era practice as
providing powerful evidence of original meaning. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note
148, at 692–97; McConnell, supra note 11, at 1286–87. To the extent that framing-era
practice is afforded such weight, this brand of originalism begins to resemble reliance on
original expected applications, and accordingly encounters the problems canvassed in Part I
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have an appealing ring, but it is unclear that they provide much concrete guidance
for constitutional adjudication, especially when assessing claims that changed
circumstances have rendered framing-era practices and understandings obsolete. If
semantic originalism is to be considered of value in constitutional adjudication, we
should expect evidence that it provides a vehicle for providing some important
number of cases in an authentically originalist fashion.
No member of the Supreme Court has professed allegiance to a semantic
originalism that treats original expected applications as nonbinding. Thus, although
the jurisprudence of Justices Scalia and Thomas, for example, enables us to study
in some detail original-expected-applications originalism in practice, there is no
body of semantic originalism jurisprudence to be studied. The closest the Court has
come to embracing semantic originalism is the decision in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.,160 in which the Court rejected due process and equal protection
attacks on a zoning ordinance even though “zone laws are of modern origin,”161
explaining:
Regulations, the wisdom, necessity, and validity of which, as applied to
existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly
sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would
have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are
sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons
analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the
advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have
been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there
is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to
meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus
imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional
principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to
the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the
Constitution, of course, must fall.162
Applying this approach, the Court upheld the challenged zoning law on the ground
that the justifications advanced for separating municipalities into zones of less and
more intensive uses of land “are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as
it must be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such
provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”163
Euclid’s brand of originalism, which holds the meaning of the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses constant, while permitting them to be applied in novel
ways in light of contemporary circumstances, sounds quite like semantic
above. For a useful summary of the thinking of semantic originalists on this point, see Colby,
supra note 23, at 728–31.
160. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
161. Id. at 386.
162. Id. at 387 (emphasis omitted).
163. Id. at 395.
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originalism. Yet, it is far from clear that Euclid’s originalism is any more confining
than nonoriginalism. Historical evidence of original meaning seems to do no real
analytical work in Euclid; the Court’s decision was based wholly on an assessment
of the contemporary rationale for zoning laws. Still, one might hesitate to draw any
reliable conclusions about the difference between semantic originalism and
nonoriginalism from a dataset consisting of one case. Given the infrequency with
which semantic originalism can be found in the Court’s jurisprudence, the Court’s
work does not enable anything like a complete assessment of semantic originalism
in practice. Indeed, the paucity of semantic or “new” originalism in the Court’s
jurisprudence may itself suggest its lack of utility in the real world of constitutional
adjudication—originalism surely seemed of little real analytical aid in Euclid given
the high level of generality reflected in the original semantic meaning of the Due
Process Clause as condemning “arbitrary and oppressive” regulations.164 Still, a
number of the scholarly advocates of semantic originalism have endeavored to
demonstrate how it works in practice. The evidence from these scholarly treatments
of semantic originalism, however, suggests that it is unable, in practice, to provide
an authentically originalist vehicle for deciding cases based on historical evidence
of original meaning.
A. Liberal Semantic Originalism
Consider Professor Balkin’s version of semantic originalism. Balkin believes
that original meaning sets the boundaries or “framework” for constitutional
adjudication at the same level of generality that is to be found in the governing
constitutional text.165 Balkin’s originalist framework for adjudication, however,
provides no less leeway for nonoriginalist adjudication than is granted by
nonoriginalist accounts.
For example, Professor Balkin advances an originalist argument for a
constitutional right to abortion on the ground that the original semantic meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause embodied a broad equality
principle that forbade the government to treat any identifiable class as a disfavored
caste, and then proceeds to argue that a prohibition on abortion involves
unconstitutional discrimination by subjecting women to the burden of carrying a
pregnancy to term in the service of a governmental interest in protecting life—a
burden not imposed on men.166 One might question whether, as a matter of
historically fixed original meaning, the Fourteenth Amendment contains a very
robust anti-caste principle, given the evidence that it was originally understood to
permit racial segregation.167 But put that aside. Even crediting Balkin’s account of
original meaning, it is far from clear that abortion laws are fairly characterized as
creating a disfavored caste.
The case for prohibiting abortion is not made in terms of subordinating women;
rather, abortion opponents argue that the only way the government can vindicate its

164. Id. at 387.
165. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at 3–4, 14–16, 23–34.
166. See Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291,
312–25 (2007).
167. See supra text accompanying note 40.
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interest in the preservation of life—whether present or future—is to prohibit
abortion, even though the regulation will have a greater physical impact on
women.168 We do not necessarily think of this kind of differential burden as
involving discrimination or the creation of a subordinate caste. The approach the
Court has taken in its equal protection jurisprudence is to treat laws as
discriminatory only when “the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a particular
course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ and not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects on an identifiable group.”169 Applying this rule, the Court has held that
efforts to discourage abortion do not amount to discrimination against women.170
Professor Balkin is unhappy with this doctrine, but he offers no argument that this
conception is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment.171
There may well be good arguments on behalf of the view that abortion laws
discriminate on the basis of sex,172 though there are potent counterarguments as
well.173 For present purposes, however, what is most important is that even on
Professor Balkin’s account, there is nothing in the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment that produces a right to abortion. Balkin makes no
argument that current doctrine’s refusal to condemn laws that have an adverse
impact on a discrete group as long as they are justified by some nondiscriminatory
governmental interest is inconsistent with the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Whether abortion laws treat women as a subordinate caste is a
question that Balkin endeavors to resolve not based on any historically fixed
meaning of constitutional text, but based on a decidedly nonoriginalist view about
what amounts to discrimination against women. The only guidance that Balkin
finds in history is to identify an equality principle in the Fourteenth Amendment.174
How this differs from nonoriginalist approaches to the Equal Protection Clause is
entirely unclear. In Brown, for example, history did no more of the analytical work:
explicitly declining to make any use of history, the Court nevertheless embraced
the same equality principle that Balkin trumpets, and used it to conclude that
separate-but-equal segregation effectively subordinated African Americans and was
therefore unconstitutional.175 History plays no greater role in Balkin’s claim that

168. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 695–97.
169. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 610 (1985) (quoting Personnel Adm’r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
170. See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 271–72 (1993).
171. See Balkin, supra note 166, at 325.
172. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
955, 1016–28 (1984); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1311–24 (1991); Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV.
261, 348–80 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special
Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 31–44 (1992).
173. See, e.g., Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: Debunking Equal Protection
Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889, 907–46 (2011); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
995, 1009 n.35 (2003).
174. See Balkin, supra note 166, at 311–25.
175. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488–95 (1954).

2012]

ORIGINALISM IN PRACTICE

1215

abortion laws unconstitutionally discriminate against women. The analytical heavy
lifting is performed by nonoriginalist claims about the meaning of discrimination.
Balkin’s originalism quacks an awful lot like a nonoriginalist duck.176
The same problem is evident in the other argument for a constitutional right to
abortion that Professor Balkin advances—he claims that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment177 protects abortion because the
original meaning of the clause was to secure rights regarded as fundamental
aspects of citizenship, and because in recent decades the right to abortion has
come to be regarded as a fundamental right of reproductive autonomy.178 That the
framing generation did not regard abortion as a fundamental right is immaterial;
this brand of originalism, we are told, is “dynamic, depending on the emerging
customs, expectations and traditions of the American people as a whole.”179
Balkin adds: “That we are not bound by the specific purposes of the adopters is
especially important . . . in the case of textual commitments to unenumerated
rights, for example, in the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”180

176. Conversely, Professor Balkin seems entirely willing to rely on original expected
applications when it serves his purposes. He quarrels with the Supreme Court’s holding that
Congress lacks power under the Fourteenth Amendment to interpret what the Amendment
prohibits in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). See Jack M. Balkin, The
Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1810–15 (2010). The historical evidence of
original meaning on which he relies, however, does not involve the original semantic
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power, which does not obviously or
unambiguously grant Congress interpretive power, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The
Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article.”). Instead, he invokes the actions and stated beliefs of the framing-era Congress and
its members as to the scope of congressional enforcement power. See Balkin, supra at 1821–
23. It is, however, entirely unclear why, under Balkin’s methodology, we should regard this
evidence as reflecting anything more than original expected applications that are not
interpretively binding. On this score, Professor Balkin tells us only that “[t]his evidence is
important not because the intentions of the framers bind us today but because they are
evidence of the constitutional structure that the three new amendments created—that is, how
a reconstructed Constitution was supposed to work.” Id. at 1823 (emphasis omitted). Yet, the
same type of evidence is afforded no significance when it comes to segregation; the
Reconstruction Congress was content to operate a segregated school system in the District of
Columbia. See Klarman, supra note 40, at 1908. Nor does Balkin explain why the views of
the ratifying states about “how a reconstructed Constitution was supposed to work” are to be
discounted when it comes to segregation; as we have seen, framing-era practice in the
ratifying states widely regarded racial segregation in public education as permissible. See
supra text accompanying note 40. Perhaps most important, when he states his own view of
the scope of congressional power, Balkin invokes not historical evidence but a variety of
prudential considerations that he claims favor granting Congress an interpretive role. See
Balkin, supra at 1824–31.
177. “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
178. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at 215–18.
179. Id. at 211.
180. Id. at 343 n.18.
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As Professor Balkin acknowledges, the claim that abortion has come to be
regarded as a fundamental right is problematic; only four states had legalized
abortion at the time of Roe, and Balkin concedes that it is hard to tell whether
current support for Roe is in significant part a consequence of Roe itself rather
than a reflection of any widespread belief about the fundamental character of the
abortion right.181 Support for Roe seems to have stabilized at around sixty
percent;182 it is far from clear that this is adequate to establish that abortion is
currently regarded as a fundamental aspect of citizenship. But putting all this
aside, it is striking how little work framing-era meaning performs in Balkin’s
analysis. On Balkin’s account, history tells us only that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects “fundamental” rights, leaving future generations entirely
free to decide what they regard as fundamental. Accordingly, Balkin’s claim that
abortion should be regarded as a “privilege or immunity” of citizenship is not
based on the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text, but instead on his
view of contemporary thinking about the importance of the abortion right. It is
entirely obscure how this differs from Roe’s nonoriginalist approach to abortion,
in which the Court also concluded, without placing reliance on framing-era
conceptions, that the Fourteenth Amendment protects “fundamental” rights and
then proceeded to characterize abortion as involving such a fundamental right
based on the Court’s nonoriginalist view of the importance of reproductive
autonomy once outmoded historical conceptions about abortion are put aside.183
As Justice Scalia once observed, once one posits the original meaning of
constitutional text has “evolving content,” there remains “really no difference
between the faint-hearted originalist and the moderate nonoriginalist, except that
the former finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original
evolutionary intent, and the latter thinks that superfluous.”184 Under Balkin’s

181. See id. at 217.
182. See Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Abortion’s New Battle Lines, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/opinion/01blow.html.
183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 147–54 (1973). The same is true of Professor
Balkin’s claim that the governmental interest in protecting life provides no sufficient
justification for laws proscribing abortion on the ground that the law has not traditionally
treated abortion as tantamount to murder. See Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 522–27 (2007). Balkin makes no
claim that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade government to erect
barriers to the exercise of what were regarded as fundamental rights in the service of a
sufficiently compelling governmental interest, nor does he claim that under the original
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the government must equate a practice to murder—
even one involving what is thought to be a fundamental right—in order to proscribe it.
Indeed, given that pre-Roe abortion laws typically provided for sanctions less onerous than
those imposed on murder, it is far from clear that the government must equate abortion to
murder in order to proscribe it, at least based on the available historical evidence of what is
regarded as a sufficient basis for government regulation. An argument that the government’s
failure to equate abortion with murder sufficiently undermines the strength of the
government’s interest in proscribing abortion may be persuasive, but it is not based on any
historically fixed meaning of the privileges or immunities of citizenship.
184. Scalia, supra note 13, at 861–62. To provide one more example from Professor
Balkin’s scholarship, he contends that the original meaning of the Constitution’s Commerce
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Fourteenth Amendment originalism, there is no discernable daylight between
Balkin’s semantic originalism and nonoriginalism. Both are committed to
protecting “fundamental” rights and equality, and, in defining these conceptions,
the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text plays no identifiable role. One
also has to wonder whether an interpretive methodology that places at its center
the views of the contemporary public about what rights should be regarded as
fundamental can legitimately be labeled originalist. One can wonder as well
whether this methodology makes much sense; presumably the politically
accountable branches of government should be more reliable barometers of public
sensibilities than the judiciary. As Justice Scalia once asked: “If the Constitution
were . . . a novel invitation to apply current societal values, what reason would
there be to believe that the invitation was addressed to the courts rather than to
the legislature?”185
One can observe the same inability to offer an approach to constitutional
adjudication distinct from that of nonoriginalism in the work of Professor Balkin’s
colleague, Akhil Amar. Although Professor Amar has never presented a fully
developed theory of originalist constitutional interpretation, he seems to be a
semantic originalist given his interest in using historical argument to apply the
Constitution’s text but without treating original expected applications as binding.186
Clause permitted federal regulation of intrastate activity that had effects in other states, and
although acknowledging that these “spillover effects” were understood narrowly in the
framing era, he contends that in a modern, nationalized economy it came to be understood
that these spillover effects were far more pervasive and justified far greater federal
regulation than was thought necessary in the framing era. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at
143–45. This differs little from Justice Holmes’s nonoriginalist formulation: “[C]ommerce
among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the
course of business.” Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905). In other words,
on Balkin’s view, like that of Holmes, any nonoriginalist argument explaining that intrastate
activity has some practical consequence for the interstate economy will fall within the
commerce power. On this account, the original meaning of the Constitution’s text is simply
an invitation to supply evolving content as the understanding of the interstate economic
effects of regulated activity evolves.
185. Scalia, supra note 13, at 854. This concern is not unique to originalists such as
Justice Scalia; the decidedly nonoriginalist John Ely made essentially the same point decades
ago. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 64–69
(1980). Balkin attempts an answer to this objection by claiming that that judicial review
slows the process of constitutional change “until the change in constitutional culture proves
lasting,” and therefore “channels and disciplines present-day majorities through
supermajoritarian rules that cannot easily change overnight (but can change eventually); this
prevents drastic changes in governance and keeps temporary majorities from altering or
subverting the constitutional values of more temporally extended supermajorities.” BALKIN,
supra note 11, at 326. Strikingly, Balkin describes this as one of the “features of living
constitutionalism,” id., making it clear that he understands that one does not need
originalism, but only a modicum of nonoriginalist prudence, to achieve such restraint.
Beyond that, it would seem that more straightforward supermajoritarian requirements would
be a better way of imposing restraint on transient majorities than leaving the assessment of
current “constitutional culture” to a cloistered judiciary.
186. For helpful characterizations of Amar’s scholarship along these lines, see Solum,
supra note 11, at 932; and Adrian Vermeule & Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and
Amar: The Trouble with Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 744–45 (2000).

1218

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:1183

To the extent that he qualifies as an originalist, Professor Amar is plainly not of the
original-expected-applications variety. For example, in connection with the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure, he has written:
“‘Reasonableness’ is not some set of specific rules, frozen in 1791 or 1868 amber,
but an honest and sensible textual formula . . . .”187 It is difficult to imagine any
nonoriginalist quarreling with this “formula” and for good reason—it is difficult to
understand how it forecloses any nonoriginalist approach to the Fourth
Amendment. Once one no longer ties “reasonableness” to framing-era practice,
pretty much anything is fair game.
An example helps to make the point. Professor Amar opposes the rule providing
for the exclusion of evidence obtained through a violation of the Fourth
Amendment as inconsistent with the framing-era understanding that the remedy for
an illegal search or seizure was a civil action for damages.188 Professor Lessig, in
contrast, argues that the exclusionary rule is now justified since the common-law
damages remedy has come to be regarded as inadequate.189 Indeed, when it
concluded that the Constitution mandated that the states utilize the Fourth
Amendment’s exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court reasoned that experience had
demonstrated that nonexclusionary remedies had failed to provide effective
protection for Fourth Amendment rights.190 The question whether civil damages
actions would provide an adequate remedy for Fourth Amendment violations is a
complex one which has spawned a rich literature.191 For present purposes, however,
the critical point is that once one pockets Professor Amar’s concession that
framing-era practice is not controlling, originalism is of no help in assessing the
debate about whether the exclusionary rule is necessary to protect Fourth
Amendment rights.192 If Professor Lessig is correct that it has become apparent that

187. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 44 (1997).
188. See id. at 20–31, 40–43.
189. See Lessig, supra note 78, at 1228–33.
190. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650–57 (1961).
191. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Resolving the Dilemma of the Exclusionary Rule: An
Application of Restitutive Principles of Justice, 32 EMORY L.J. 937, 969–85 (1983); Donald
Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That
Wrong Road Again”, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1616–23 (1996); Daryl J. Levinson, Making
Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 345, 369–72, 415–18 (2000); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59–64 (1994); Daniel J.
Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and
Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 283–86 (1988); Richard
A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 53–68 (1981);
Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 363, 394–423 (1999).
192. Cf. George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1819, 1837 (1997) (reviewing AMAR, supra note 187) (“[I]t is not clear to me why
inferring a civil remedy regime is a more satisfying Fourth Amendment construction than
inferring the remedy of exclusion. The Amendment mentions neither remedy expressly. The
historical pedigree of a civil enforcement model is admittedly better than that of the
exclusionary rule, but civil enforcement has thorny problems that Amar ignores or
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civil damages actions provide an inadequate remedy for constitutional violations,
nothing in Professor Amar’s originalism warrants rejection of Professor Lessig’s
conclusion about the exclusionary rule. Professors Amar and Lessig can resolve
their dispute only through the same nonoriginalist method that the Supreme Court
employed—inquiring whether, under contemporary conditions, nonexclusionary
remedies provide a sufficiently effective means for protecting Fourth Amendment
rights.
Perhaps, however, the failure of Professors Amar and Balkin to develop an
authentically originalist jurisprudence constitutes unsatisfactory evidence of a
failure of semantic originalism. Professors Amar and Balkin have been described as
“liberal” originalists because they advance originalist justifications for what are
usually regarded as liberal positions.193 For that reason, they could be thought
unlikely to embrace a brand of originalism that would use original meaning as a
constraint on what they might regard as progressive constitutional reform. Indeed,
as Professor Balkin describes his version of semantic originalism, it merely sets the
boundaries for nonoriginalist argument about the proper construction of vague or
ambiguous constitutional text, and in that fashion reconciles originalism with living
constitutionalism.194 Thus, Balkin believes that “originalism and living
constitutionalism . . . are actually flip sides of the same coin.”195 For this reason,
Balkin’s approach is vulnerable to the charge that it offers only “living
constitutionalism . . . dressed up in originalist clothing.”196 A semantic originalist
with less concern for reaching what are regarded as liberal results might provide
more rigorous originalist constraints for constitutional adjudication that could
produce a genuinely originalist approach to constitutional adjudication.
B. Libertarian Semantic Originalism
Consider the originalism of Randy Barnett, widely regarded as a leading
libertarian legal scholar.197 As a libertarian, Professor Barnett has perhaps more
reason than liberals to develop a muscular originalism as a potent check on
governmental power.
For example, Professor Barnett argues that the original meaning of the
Commerce Clause198 granted Congress authority to regularize or prohibit wrongful
acts with respect to trade or exchange crossing state or national borders, but left

minimizes.” (footnote omitted)).
193. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 664; Stein, supra note 17, at 400–01
& n.20.
194. See BALKIN, supra note 11, at 3–4, 22–23, 33–34, 277.
195. Balkin, supra note 151, at 551.
196. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56
UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1372 (2009). To similar effect, see, for example, Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 857, 879–81 (2009); and Smith, supra note 152, at 230–33.
197. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial
Activism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081–82 (2005)
(reviewing BARNETT, supra note 11); Colby & Smith, supra note 7, at 305 n.310.
198. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with Indian tribes . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 3.
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Congress powerless to regulate intrastate activity such as agriculture or
manufacturing even if it produced goods later sent into interstate commerce.199
Even Justice Scalia has rejected this view, relying on the Necessary and Proper
Clause200 to conclude that Congress may regulate intrastate activity when necessary
to make regulation of interstate commerce fully effective, such as when it regulates
the intrastate distribution of controlled substances because of the ease with which
they can be diverted into the interstate market and the effects they can have on
supply and demand in that market.201 Barnett, for his part, does not doubt that the
Necessary and Proper Clause can supplement congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause, but he argues that the original meaning of the Clause requires
that an exercise of congressional authority be more than merely convenient, though,
he admits, not indispensable, and accordingly courts must scrutinize legislation
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to ensure that it appropriately advances a
legitimate federal power.202 Barnett also argues that the original meaning of the
Ninth Amendment203 and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taken together, offers general protection for individual liberty, and on
that basis he claims that the Constitution erects a presumption of liberty that
requires courts to insist that all legislation that restricts individual liberty be
adequately justified.204
Some have argued that Professor Barnett has overstated the historical evidence
in favor of his libertarian conception of original meaning.205 Even putting this
aside, however, what is most striking is that the mode of adjudication that Professor
Barnett commends is anything but originalist. As a semantic originalist, Professor
Barnett rejects framing-era practice as controlling.206 Moreover, he makes no claim
that the historical evidence of original meaning mandates a presumption of liberty.
As for the Ninth Amendment, Barnett claims only that its original meaning was
that “the rights retained by the people cannot be confined to the specific liberties
identified by originalist materials,” and, accordingly, “[w]e can protect the
unenumerable rights retained by the people by shifting the background
interpretive presumption of constitutionality whenever legislation restricts the
liberties of the people” as “a way to protect the rights retained by the people

199. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 317–18.
200. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 18.
201. See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33–42 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment).
202. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 173–90.
203. “The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
204. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 277–318.
205. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 197, at 1087–88; Jack N. Rakove, Conjuring with–
and for–the People, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 660, 664–69 (2005) (reviewing BARNETT,
supra note 11); Douglas G. Smith, Does the Constitution Embody a Presumption of Liberty?,
2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 328–37 (same).
206. See Barnett, supra note 148, at 405–09.
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without having to list them.”207 There is, of course, more than a little daylight
between Barnett’s originalist claim that the Ninth Amendment contemplates
unenumerated rights and the presumption he advocates against all government
regulation of whatever stripe. The Ninth Amendment’s original meaning, even on
Barnett’s view, falls short of a presumption of liberty, which is instead
presumably offered as a nonoriginalist construction of the text, even though its
original meaning requires no more than the recognition of some sort of
unenumerated rights. Barnett’s nonoriginalism is even more apparent when it
comes to the Fourteenth Amendment, where he admits that “we have no original
meaning to apply to the problem at hand and so are thrown back upon the
technique of constitutional construction.”208 Thus, however appealing Barnett’s
presumption of liberty may be, it involves a nonoriginalist construction of a
constitutional text, the original meaning of which stops well short of a presumption
of liberty.
As for the mechanics of Professor Barnett’s presumption of liberty, he argues
that it requires a sufficient fit between legislative means and ends and the use of
the least restrictive means assessed through a form of intermediate judicial
scrutiny, though he makes no claim that this methodology was a part of the
original meaning of any constitutional provision.209 Indeed, it is highly doubtful
that framing-era understandings of either the Ninth or Fourteenth Amendment can
support any very robust requirement of heightened judicial scrutiny of government
regulation in light of the ubiquity of regulation in American history from the
framing through the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.210 For example, as
we have seen, prohibitions on abortion were among the many regulations prevalent
in the framing era, even though the Court found their justifications to be in
significant part obsolete by the time of Roe v. Wade.211 Yet Professor Barnett tells
us that he is “sympathetic” to Professor Balkin’s “conclusions about the
unconstitutionality of [prohibiting] abortion,”212 which, as we have seen, do not rest
on historical evidence of original meaning but rather on contemporary judgments
about the character of abortion regulation.213
In any event, the leeway granted for nonoriginalist adjudication under Professor
Barnett’s presumption of liberty is enormous. Without claiming support in any
historical evidence of original meaning, when applying the presumption of liberty,
Barnett advocates the most common libertarian approach to regulation, regarding
any restriction on liberty as unjustified unless the regulated activity has some

207.
208.
209.
210.

BARNETT, supra note 11, at 259.
Id. at 321.
See id. at 336–45.
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 51–233 (1996).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 122–25. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent,
“[b]y the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, there were at least 36
laws enacted by state or territorial legislatures limiting abortion.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 174–75 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
212. Barnett, supra note 148, at 411.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 167–83.
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harmful effect on others or that is necessary to protect the rights of others.214 As
Bernard Harcourt has observed, however, in recent years the libertarian “harm
principle” has lost much of its bite as a variety of arguments have gained currency
that endeavor to explain how seemingly victimless activities, such as drinking,
prostitution, or pornography, actually do cause harm to others, or to society at
large.215 Accepting as he does that original expected applications of constitutional
text are not interpretively binding, Barnett’s approach does not foreclose
acceptance of any of these nonoriginalist justifications for regulation, even though
they could render his presumption of liberty effectively useless. Thus, Professor
Barnett’s approach to constitutional adjudication turns not on the framing-era
meaning of constitutional text, but rather on contemporary policy debates over the
wisdom of regulation. Professor Barnett’s semantic originalism therefore offers
little more originalist discipline for constitutional adjudication than that of
Professors Amar and Balkin.216 Once again, constitutional adjudication ultimately
turns on assessments of a variety of nonoriginalist arguments about the wisdom of
legislation, not the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text. Nonoriginalists
should be pleased. Indeed, pretty much giving up the game, Barnett has written that
his account “should be acceptable even to many nonoriginalists.”217 Indeed.

214. See BARNETT, supra note 11, at 261–62, 348–50.
215. See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 139–81 (1999).
216. An even more basic problem infects the approach of another leading libertarian
originalist, Richard Epstein. A semantic originalist, he argues that constitutional
interpretation should be based on the original public meaning of the text rather than the
intentions of the framers as to the scope of permissible government power. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 19–29 (1985).
Yet, when Professor Epstein offered his interpretation of the scope of governmental power in
light of the Constitution’s requirement that “private property” not be “taken for a public use,
without just compensation,” U.S. CONST. amend. V, he argued that because, in the framing
era, many embraced the view of John Locke that governmental power could be legitimately
exercised only to the extent that it offered protection for property rights of equivalent value
to the property that the government demanded by taxation or otherwise, governmental power
under the Fifth Amendment can be no greater. See EPSTEIN, supra, at 7–18. Epstein,
however, makes no effort to demonstrate that the original public meaning of the words of the
Fifth Amendment was to codify Locke; indeed, some believe that Epstein overstated the
importance of Locke to early American legal thought. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History
“Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 560–63 (1995).
Others have argued that the original meaning of the Takings Clause was merely to require
compensation for an exercise of the power of eminent domain. See, e.g., Matthew P.
Harrington, “Public Use” and the Original Understanding of the So-Called “Takings”
Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1278–1301 (2002); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J.
1077, 1119–24 (1993). At best, Professor Epstein may have described the original intended
application of the Takings Clause, but even then, he does not explain why the concept of
equivalent exchange—if indeed necessary to avoid the compensation requirement as
consequence of the original meaning of the term “taken”—could not evolve if the public
came to understand that other kinds of governmentally funded benefits, such as welfare or
education, also provided important if difficult to quantify value to taxpayers by enhancing
social stability.
217. Barnett, supra note 12, at 617.
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C. Conservative Semantic Originalism
For a strong semantic originalism, perhaps we should look not to liberals or
libertarians. Because of their disregard for framing-era arrangements, liberal and
libertarian semantic originalism produce weak originalism; and, as we have seen,
weak originalism quickly bleeds into nonoriginalism. To find a strong semantic
originalism that offers an approach to constitutional adjudication distinct from
nonoriginalism, perhaps it makes sense to focus on a true conservative—one who
looks to history as a means of constraint, rather than as a vehicle for liberal or
libertarian reform. No better candidate comes to mind than Robert Bork, “the
leading contemporary advocate of originalist strict construction.”218
Like Professor Barnett, Judge Bork pushes the historical evidence hard to
produce what at first blush seems a rigorous semantic originalism, although there
are worms in the apple. For example, Bork agrees with Barnett that the Commerce
Clause precludes congressional regulation of intrastate activity, although he is
strangely silent on the Necessary and Proper Clause.219 He also argues that the
constitutional guarantee of due process is not a constraint on legislative power, but
instead secures only fair adjudicative procedures,220 albeit without grappling with
some significant historical evidence to the contrary on which others have relied.221
He argues that the Ninth Amendment protects only state-law rights,222 but again
without grappling with the considerable historical evidence to the contrary to which
others point.223 As for the constitutional guarantee of “equal protection of the law,”
Judge Bork argues that its original meaning was to protect only African Americans,
or, at most, to mandate heightened judicial scrutiny of racial classifications, but
requires no more than a rational basis for other classifications.224 Yet, given that the
Fourteenth Amendment’s text makes no reference to race, a special rule for racial
classifications seems more like an original expected application than original
meaning defined at the level of generality found in the text. Bork also believes that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause should go
unenforced because he regards it as insolubly ambiguous.225 It is, of course, a

218. Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333,
1338 (1992).
219. See BORK, supra note 14, at 56–57.
220. See id. at 31–32.
221. See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the
Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999); Frederick Mark
Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009); Ryan C. Williams,
The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 460–500 (2010).
222. See BORK, supra note 14, at 183–85.
223. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 11, at 54–60, 234–52; DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED
BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 21–44 (2007); Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s
Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to a Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment,
60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 940–54 (2008). For a scholarly account consistent with Bork’s view,
see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 13–94 (2009).
224. See BORK, supra note 14, at 149–50, 182–83.
225. See id. at 166.
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strange type of originalism that gives no effect to duly enacted constitutional text.
The least likely account of the original meaning of any constitutional text is surely
that it had no meaning at all. One has to wonder whether Bork’s assessment of this
clause is truly originalist, or is instead based on an ideological aversion to the
leading originalist accounts of the clause—that it was intended to secure rights
regarded as fundamental,226 or imposed a nondiscrimination obligation with respect
to such rights.227 In any event, even crediting this view of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, it is plainly premised not on the original meaning of anything
actually in the Constitution, but rather on prudential concerns about the risk of error
that inheres in originalist interpretation in the face of conflicting evidence.228
Eventually, however, Judge Bork’s originalism collapses. As a semantic
originalist, Bork accommodates changed circumstances and understandings; he
defends Brown, for example, by arguing that the framing generation did not fully
understand the implications of the equality principal that it enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment.229 He defends enhanced First Amendment protection for
the press against defamation liability beyond framing-era standards on the ground
that subsequent experience has made plain that the press needs greater protection in
order to play its essential role in republican government.230 As we have seen in our
consideration of Professor Lessig’s approach, however, if historical understandings
can be jettisoned whenever someone can argue that some relevant circumstance or
presupposition has changed since the framing era, originalism turns into
nonoriginalism pretty quickly. If the framing generation did not understand the full
implications of the equality principle that it had constitutionalized when it comes to
racial discrimination, maybe the same is true for discrimination on the basis of
alienage, gender, or sexual orientation. After all, the original meaning of the text of
the Equal Protection Clause, even on Bork’s account, does not confine its reach to
racial discrimination; and even if the framing generation expected that its reach
would be confined to racial discrimination, Bork acknowledges that the framing
generation’s expectations about how the text would be applied are not binding.

226. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3085–86 (2010) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); AMAR, supra note 77, at 163–230;
BALKIN, supra note 11, at 195–200; BARNETT, supra note 11, at 60–68, 192–203; MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 57–91, 215–20 (1986).
227. See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–1888, at 342–51 (1985); John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1397–432 (1992).
228. Cf. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030 (plurality opinion) (declining to adopt petitioners’
submission on the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause after observing
that “petitioners are unable to identify the Clause's full scope. Nor is there any consensus on
that question among the scholars . . . .” (citation omitted)). I have elsewhere summarized
what I regard as the confusing and conflicting evidence on the original meaning of this
Clause. See Lawrence Rosenthal, The New Originalism Meets the Fourteenth Amendment:
Original Public Meaning and the Problem of Incorporation, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
361 (2009).
229. See BORK, supra note 14, at 81–82.
230. See id. at 168–69.
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The point can be generalized beyond the context of equal protection. For
example, if Judge Bork is correct that the framing generation did not grasp the
implications of the First Amendment’s protections for common law defamation
liability, maybe the whole of framing-era law relating to free speech and freedom
of the press must be jettisoned as well, once the centrality of free debate to
republican government came to be fully understood.231 Similarly, if Judge Bork is
correct that the framing-era understanding of the constitutional guarantee of due
process was that it had no application to legislation, perhaps this understanding is
itself obsolete in light of changed circumstances. The text does not state that “due
process” is only required in adjudication, and the framing-era understanding that
the guarantee of due process was inapplicable to legislation could be regarded as no
more than an original expected application. After all, the concept of due process
evolved in England, where Parliament exercised supreme authority in the absence
of a written constitution, and could have acquired a different meaning when
transferred to the United States Constitution, which provides that it is the supreme
law of the land to which even statutes must conform.232 Perhaps the framing
generation did not grasp the full implications of a written constitution for the
concept of due process. Whether this argument persuades or not, there is nothing in
Bork’s originalism that enables one to reject it. If, as Bork contends, the framing
generation did not understand the full implications of the equality principle it
adopted when it came to racial segregation, or the free speech principle it adopted
in the First Amendment, maybe the same is true for the prohibitions on deprivation
of life, liberty, and property without due process of law, cruel and unusual
punishment, unreasonable search and seizure, and so on.233

231. For arguments along these lines about the original meaning of the First Amendment,
see Stanley C. Brubaker, Original Intent and the Freedom of Speech and Press, in THE BILL
OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 82, 88–89 (Eugene W.
Hickok Jr. ed., 1991); and Lawrence Rosenthal, First Amendment Investigations and the
Inescapable Pragmatism of the Common Law of Free Speech, 86 IND. L.J. 1, 26–32 (2011).
232. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 28–34 (2007).
233. A similar problem infects Professor Strang’s semantic originalism. He argues that
for broadly framed constitutional text, a survey of framing-era understandings and practice
makes it possible to abstract a general principle that can then be applied to contemporary
issues in light of changed circumstances and understandings. See Strang, supra note 81, at
956–80. As an example, Professor Strang notes that the Equal Protection Clause was
originally understood to outlaw the discriminatory laws targeting the newly freed slaves and
to ensure that laws were enforced nondiscriminatorily, but it protected only what were
regarded as civil and not political rights, a distinction that should be applied in light of
contemporary circumstances. Id. at 989–90 & n.345. The constitutional text, however, does
not codify a distinction between civil and political rights; thus, it is unclear why the
distinction that the framing generation often drew between civil and political rights amounts
to anything more than an original intended application. Even Professor Strang
acknowledges, “the framers and ratifiers of the Equal Protection Clause adopted an abstract
principle of equality. Their own conception of equality—under which segregation was
consistent with equality—was flawed and is not binding on subsequent interpreters.” Id. at
949 (footnote omitted). It is equally unclear how a series of original expected applications
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Judge Bork is not the only conservative semantic originalist who encounters
difficulty with semantic originalism’s willingness to accommodate changed
circumstances and understandings. Steven Calabresi and Saikrishna Prakash, for
example, have argued that that congressional efforts to limit presidential control
over the duties or removal of officials engaged in the administration or enforcement
of the laws are unconstitutional, contending that the Constitution’s vesting of
“executive Power” in the President,234 the President’s constitutional obligation to
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”235 and the President’s
constitutional authority to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer
in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of
their respective Offices,”236 confers on the President unfettered authority over all
those involved in the administration or enforcement of the law.237 Perhaps this
textual argument persuades, but it is far from clear that if the President is able to
remove some subordinate executive officials only for cause, then he is no longer
vested with the “executive Power” or is unable to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.” Indeed, as then-Professor Elena Kagan demonstrated, the
President is able to exercise quite substantial control over agencies involved in the
administration and enforcement of the law even within a statutory framework that
grants him less than plenary power over the officials in charge of those agencies.238
Most scholars have found Article II no more than ambiguous on this point,239 and
the Supreme Court has rejected the Calabresi and Prakash reading of the text.240
Professors Calabresi and Prakash, however, are not out of bullets if their textual
argument does not carry the day; they bolster it with an originalist argument that
the framing-era understanding of Article II granted the President complete control
over executive functions, which were then understood to include the process by
which laws were administered and enforced.241
that are not interpretively binding and may even be later discarded altogether can
nevertheless produce a general principle that somehow becomes interpretively binding. For
example, on Professor Strang’s view, it seems that the general principal governing the Equal
Protection Clause would have to accommodate racial segregation since, as we have seen, the
permissibility of racial segregation seems to have been the original understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See supra text accompanying note 40.
234. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
235. Id. § 3.
236. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
237. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 559–99.
238. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2319–46
(2001).
239. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 83–93 (2009); Robert B. Percival, Presidential Management of the
Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967–69 (2001);
Peter M. Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional
Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 611–12 (1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
573, 597–99 (1984).
240. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988).
241. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 603–63. For a more recent restatement of
this position, adducing additional historical evidence of framing-era practice in the wake of
the Constitution’s ratification, see STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE
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Some scholars have offered different interpretations of the historical evidence of
the original understanding of Article II.242 But even if it is correct that, in the
framing era, the “executive Power” was understood to include unfettered
presidential control over all officials engaged in the administration and enforcement
of the laws, Congress might conclude that the subsequent growth in the power of
the presidency to a level unknown in the framing era gives rise to fears of abuse of
executive power that could undermine the public’s confidence that the laws will be
properly administered, that is, “faithfully executed,” unless Congress exercises its
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to grant some executive officials—
perhaps those exercising particularly sensitive responsibilities that might be better
performed with some insulation from partisan political considerations—a measure
of protection from partisan political influence. Such legislation need not be
regarded as preventing the President from exercising “executive Power,” even in
terms of its original semantic meaning as identified by Professors Calabresi and
Prakash. That is because legislation limiting the influence of partisanship in law
enforcement would still vest in the President the power to supervise all officials
engaged in the administration or enforcement of the laws in order to ensure that
they properly discharge those responsibilities, while adhering as well to the
limitations imposed by such a law on the influence of partisan politics in the
administration and enforcement of the law. Martin Flaherty has advanced an
argument along these lines.243
One may be unpersuaded by Professor Flaherty’s argument, but there is no basis
in semantic originalism that enables one to reject it as a justification for departing
from the framing-era understanding with respect to presidential power. In contrast
to the President’s appointment power,244 Article II has no Removals Clause that
hardwires in the text a presidential prerogative to remove at will all subordinate
executive officials. What is hardwired in the Constitution is that the “executive
Power”—on Professors Calabresi and Prakash’s account of original meaning, the
power to administer and enforce the law—is vested exclusively in the President.
Perhaps, however, some laws are best administered or enforced by officials at a
remove from partisan warfare.
Although the framing generation may have seen little justification for insulating
subordinate executive officials from plenary presidential power in light of the
UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 30–122 (2008).
242. See, e.g., Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics
and Tenure Powers in the Court, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1086–93 (1988); Gerhard Casper,
An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 211, 212–42 (1989); Driesen, supra note 239, at 96–110; Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755–1810 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Checks and
Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138–53 (1994);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 12–78 (1994); Shane, supra note 239, at 602–06, 613–17; Strauss, supra, note 239,
at 599–608.
243. See Flaherty, supra note 242, at 1810–31, 1835–36; see also Martin S. Flaherty,
Relearning Founding Lessons: The Removal Power and Joint Accountability, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1563, 1568–71, 1588–93 (1997). For an analogous argument focusing on the
emergence of administrative agencies exercising much broader powers than were envisioned
in the framing era, see Greene, supra note 242, at 153–79.
244. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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checks and balances created through the Constitution’s separation of legislative and
executive powers, this assessment may have been overtaken by the growth in
presidential power, as Professor Flaherty contends, or by the emergence of political
parties with representatives in both the executive and legislative branches that
undermined the efficacy of the formal separation of powers created by the
Constitution.245 Semantic originalism, in turn, does not require that the framers’
expectations about the scope of presidential control over subordinate executive
officers be treated as anything more than an “original expected application” that is
not interpretively binding in light of changed circumstances or understandings. A
president with the power to ensure that subordinate executive officials properly
discharge their responsibilities on a nonpartisan basis or face dismissal for cause
could still be vested with “the executive Power,” the original meaning of which
Professors Calabresi and Prakash tell us was simply the power to administer and
enforce the law.246 To be sure, there may be persuasive counterarguments
supporting unfettered presidential authority over all executive functions,247 but they
are not rooted in the original meaning of Article II, at least once framing-era
practices and understandings are discarded as a basis for fleshing out vagueness
and ambiguity in original meaning because they are no more than original expected
applications of constitutional text.
For his part, as a semantic originalist, Professor Calabresi agrees that original
expected applications of constitutional text are not interpretively binding248 and
concedes that the Necessary and Proper Clause permits Congress to alter framingera arrangements based on an evolving understanding of the manner in which
federal power should be exercised.249 He also agrees that while “the Necessary and
Proper Clause does not permit Congress to tell the President how he ought to
implement his own constitutional powers, it does enable Congress to structure the
administration of federal law.”250 These, however, are the key points that could lead
a semantic originalist to reject framing-era practices regarding presidential control
over subordinate officers as reliable indicators of original meaning. Perhaps the
growth in the scope of executive power and partisan political influence since the
framing era means that Congress could conclude that only officials with a measure
of insulation from partisan politics should administer or enforce the most sensitive
laws. If this departs from framing-era practice, semantic originalism regards such

245. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,
119 HARV . L. REV. 2311, 2316–25 (2006).
246. See supra text accompanying note 242.
247. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary
Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 48–95 (1995).
248. See Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 669–71; Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T.
Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (2011). Indeed,
Professor Calabresi and a coauthor have written: “[T]he original meaning of a clause or text
is [not] defined by the Framers’ original expected applications. . . . [O]riginal expected
applications are not enacted by the text, and legislators are often unaware of the implications
of laws they enact. In so arguing, we agree with Yale law professor Jack Balkin.” Id. at 3
(footnote omitted).
249. Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 666.
250. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 11, at 592.
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departures as unremarkable. So it goes for pretty much all constitutional questions
that do not have their answers hardwired into constitutional text.251
Judge Bork, for one, grasps the potential of semantic originalism to devour itself
and has tried to devise a solution:
No doubt there is a spectrum along which the adjustments of doctrine to
take account of new social, technological, and legal developments may
gradually become so great as to amount to the creation of a new
principle. But that observation notes a danger; it does not justify letting

251. For yet another example of the inability of conservative semantic originalism to
resolve constitutional disputes once original expected applications are cast aside, consider
Professor Calabresi’s criticism of the decision recognizing a right of consenting adults to
engage in homosexual sex in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). He argues that the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause was to
afford protection to fundamental rights deeply rooted in history, subject to reasonable
exercise of the police power, and because these fundamental rights, as well as the proper
scope of the police power, must be based on framing-era conceptions, the recognition of a
right to homosexual sex is indefensible. See Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An
Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097, 1108–15 (2004). Calabresi, however, agrees
that the framing generation’s original expected applications of constitutional text are not
binding because “fidelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to original expected
application,” Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 672. It is therefore entirely unclear why
the framing generation’s view on what were thought to be deeply rooted rights and what was
regarded as the proper scope of the police power is anything more than an original expected
application that is not interpretively binding. In any event, it is difficult to understand why
the right of consenting adults to engage in private heterosexual activity is not sufficiently
rooted to qualify for protection even under Professor Calabresi’s view of original meaning;
and since he also concedes that the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
secured equality with respect to the exercise of protected rights, it is even more unclear what
originalist justification there could be for a prohibition on private, consensual sexual activity
on the part homosexuals but not heterosexuals once the framing generation’s original
expected applications are cast aside. Indeed, when he addresses the equality argument in
support of the decision in Lawrence, Professor Calabresi makes only nonoriginalist
arguments that invoke the extent of disagreement about whether sexual orientation
discrimination is currently regarded as a form of invidious caste discrimination, federalism,
and his view that the decriminalization of homosexual sex in most states is of limited
probative value in assessing what should be regarded as a fundamental civil right. See
Calabresi, supra at 1121–24. Similarly, presumably because he rejects reliance on original
expected applications, when Professor Calabresi addresses Professor Balkin’s claim that a
prohibition on abortion amounts to discrimination against women, he is forced to rely not on
original meaning, but instead on a series of nonoriginalist arguments. See Calabresi & Fine,
supra note 148, at 695–98. This should be unsurprising; in a subsequent article, Professor
Calabresi argued, much like Professor Balkin, that the original meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment included an anti-caste principle broad enough to encompass discrimination
against women, even though the framers did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to
prohibit sex discrimination. See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 248, at 47–60. Thus, the
disagreement between Professors Calabresi and Balkin on abortion rests on their differing
assessment of the strength of the nonoriginalist arguments likening laws prohibiting abortion
to anti-caste legislation; originalism is of no help in resolving this dispute.
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the process slide out of control. Judges and lawyers live on the slippery
slope of analogies; they are not supposed to ski it to the bottom. . . .
When we say that social circumstances have changed so as to require
the evolution of doctrine to maintain the vigor of an existing principle
we do not mean that society’s values are perceived by the judge to have
changed so that it would be good to have a new constitutional
principle.252
This admonition is little different than Professor Lessig’s notion of constraint—
changed reading of constitutional text cannot be based on the view that is
inconsistent with the text itself.253 As we have seen, however, this view does not
differ meaningfully from that of nonoriginalists, who also regard constitutional text
as binding. The problem for semantic originalism is that when the text states a
principle at a sufficient level of generality that the answer to a constitutional
question is not found in the text itself, virtually any changed reading can be
justified without making a claim inconsistent with the text. For example, once one
agrees that the Equal Protection Clause enshrines a principle as broad as equality,
and concedes that the framing generation could have been wrong about how that
principle should be applied to racial segregation, it seems no less possible that the
framing generation might have been wrong as well about how to apply that
principle to women, immigrants, or gays and lesbians. Once one starts down this
road, the distinction between originalism and nonoriginalism effectively
disappears.254
Some conservative originalists, evidently aware that mere admonitions to judges
not to go beyond the original meaning of constitutional text are unlikely to
foreclose latitudinarian construction when the text is written at a high level of
generality, supplement semantic originalism with a default rule; given the primacy
of representative government to our constitutional structure, they argue that
challenged legislation not clearly inconsistent with constitutional text should be
upheld.255 This argument for deferentialism may persuade some in light of the
Constitution’s evident solicitude for majoritarianism; although even some
originalists might respond that given the many countermajoritarian provisions in
the Constitution, it is far from clear that majoritarianism should be regarded as the
overriding constitutional value.256 But whether or not a presumption of
constitutionality rests on an attractive structural argument for deference to
majoritarian judgments,257 it is not originalist. The advocates of this approach
identify no evidence that a presumption of constitutionality is anchored in the

252. BORK, supra note 14, at 169.
253. See supra text accompanying note 135.
254. For a useful discussion along these lines, see Colby, supra note 23, at 755–64.
255. See, e.g., Calabresi & Fine, supra note 148, at 699; Graglia, supra note 13, at 1044;
Paulsen, supra note 11, at 2057. Justice Scalia also seems enamored of this view. See
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 832–34 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
256. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence: Robert Bork,
Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding, 24 GA. L. REV. 1045, 1070–82
(1990).
257. I appropriate the term “structural argument” from Philip Bobbitt’s typology of
constitutional argument. See BOBBITT, supra note 9, at 74–92.
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original meaning of the Constitution’s text.258 The Constitution authorizes federal
courts to hear cases “arising under this Constitution,”259 but that is as far as the text
goes. There is no Presumption of Constitutionality Clause; nor do the advocates of
that presumption argue that any portion of the Constitution had such an original
meaning.260 That conservative originalists must resort to such a presumption surely
illustrates the failure of originalism to supply a method of constitutional
adjudication distinct from that advocated by nonoriginalists.261

258. See Colby, supra note 23, at 770–71.
259. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
260. Philip Hamburger has marshaled evidence that during the framing era it was
believed that a court should apply extant law unless it was manifestly in conflict with some
higher authority, although the pertinent evidence is found in English law and American
common law, with Hamburger only able to produce a single statement from a judge
embracing this principle with respect to constitutional adjudication after the framing. See
PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 309–16 (2008). The probative value of this
evidence is open to considerable doubt; the bulk of the evidence is found in common-law
adjudication prior to the Constitution’s framing. Moreover, Professor Hamburger
acknowledges that judicial review in the United States under the Constitution acquired a
fundamentally different character from judicial review in England, in which Parliament
exercised sovereignty and therefore controlled the content of constitutional law. See id. at
395–406. One need go no further than Federalist 78 to find evidence that the original
meaning of the Constitution included a conception of judicial review as an essential part of
the process by which governmental power was to be confined to the limits prescribed in the
Constitution. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 393–97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009). For illuminating reviews of historical evidence suggesting that in the wake of the
framing, judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes was not invariably deferential, see
William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 496–97,
517, 540–41, 560–62 (2005) and Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before
the Civil War, 97 GEO. L.J. 1257, 1325–28 (2009). Perhaps more important, the evidence of
deferentialism identified by Professor Hamburger is not linked to the original meaning of the
constitutional text, and for that reason may reflect, at most, original intended applications
rather than original meaning. Professor Calabresi, for example, despite advocating a
presumption of constitutionality, acknowledges that “the Constitution is silent with regards
to presumptions, so anything we say about presumptions must instead be derived from
structural first principles.” Calabresi, supra note 197, at 1088. Beyond that, if Professor
Hamburger’s deferentialism is taken seriously, then virtually nothing would be forbidden by
the most open-ended constitutional provisions on account of their vagueness and ambiguity,
an approach seemingly no more textually tenable than Judge Bork’s suggestion that the same
open-ended constitutional text be ignored.
261. Some conservative originalists advocate a different default rule; noting that, under
the Constitution, the federal government exercises only delegated powers while the states
exercise plenary powers except when limited by the Constitution, they argue that the
presumption is against any novel exercise of federal powers and in favor of any traditional
exercise of state power. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 6, at 256; Lawson, supra note 11, at 1835.
Again, this may be an attractive structural argument, but these accounts make no effort to tie
the presumption to the original meaning of any constitutional text. At best, this default rule
could be sustained only if open-ended grants of federal power, such as the Necessary and
Proper Clause, or open-ended restrictions on state power, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses, were
interpreted in light of framing-era practice rather than at the level of generality found in the
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Thus, in actual practice, semantic originalism, like weak original-expectedapplications originalism, becomes nonoriginalism. Once one acknowledges that
any relevant change since the framing era can justify a departure from the manner
in which constitutional text was understood and applied in the framing era, for all
questions for which the answer is not already contained in constitutional text,
constitutional adjudication turns not on original meaning, but instead on an
assessment of the nonoriginalist arguments for departing from framing-era practice.
Semantic originalists concede that the framing generation may have been wrong
about how to apply vague or ambiguous constitutional text, but this is entirely
consistent with nonoriginalism as well. Once again, in practice, the distinction
between originalism and nonoriginalism collapses.
III. THE OMNIPRESENCE OF NONORIGINALISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION
One could argue that the thesis of this article is contradicted by its opening
paragraphs. Although the preceding discussion may expose some inconsistencies
among originalist judges and scholars, the reader may remain unconvinced that
originalism has little role to play in constitutional litigation. After all, the claim that
originalism, in practice, is unable to provide a genuinely originalist basis for
constitutional adjudication is seemingly undermined by the decisions of recent
years that many have identified as originalist in character.
Although there is no statistically acceptable method for identifying a random
and statistically significant sample of ostensibly originalist judicial decisions and
testing them to determine if they are truly originalist in character, likely the best
one can do is to create a sample consisting of those judicial decisions that are
widely regarded as originalist in character. Yet, an examination of what are likely
the three most prominent opinions of recent years to deploy an ostensibly
originalist methodology shows that even the assertedly originalist decisions of
recent years, on inspection, turn on nonoriginalist considerations.
A. Crawford v. Washington
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court,
holding that, under the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him,”262 an accused must be given an opportunity to crossexamine anyone whose testimonial statements are offered as evidence.263 Justice
Scalia began his opinion by conceding that “[t]he Constitution’s text does not alone
resolve this case. One could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean
those who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at trial, or
something in between.”264 To resolve the ambiguity, Justice Scalia examined
framing-era practice, observing that the confrontation requirement developed in
text; but as we have seen in Part I above, many are the problems with a strong originalexpected-applications originalism that relies on framing-era practice as a means for fleshing
out open-ended constitutional text.
262. 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend.VI).
263. Id. at 68–69.
264. Id. at 42–43 (citations omitted).
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reaction to statutes, such as those enacted in England during the reign of Queen
Mary, which authorized the use of statements previously given to investigators to
be used as evidence at criminal trials, whether sworn or unsworn, and on this basis
concluded that the confrontation requirement applied even to unsworn but
otherwise testimonial statements given to investigators.265 To so hold, the Court
rejected the approach previously taken in Ohio v. Roberts266 and its progeny, which
excused a lack of confrontation when an out-of-court statement was admitted under
a firmly rooted exception to the rule against hearsay or otherwise possessed
adequate indicia of reliability.267
Because of its heavy reliance on framing-era practice, Crawford is widely
characterized as an originalist decision,268 although some quarrel with the Court’s
analysis of the relevant historical evidence.269 Original-expected-applications
originalism, however, cannot explain the decision in Crawford. To be sure, in terms
of the original expected application of the confrontation requirement, Justice
Scalia’s opinion relies on original intended applications, noting that in the framing
era, confrontation was accomplished through cross-examination.270 But on the
question of whether the statements of an unsworn police interviewee could be
considered the “witness against” the accused within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause, original intended applications were of little use. Justice
Scalia acknowledged that the confrontation requirement was understood in the
framing era to prohibit compelled testimony in formal examinations conducted by
judicial officers in the fashion utilized in continental civil law rather than the use of
unsworn statements made in police interviews.271 He nevertheless explained that
the confrontation requirement should be extended to more informal proceedings
unknown in the framing era:
That interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not
change the picture either. Justices of the peace conducting examinations
under the Marian statutes were not magistrates as we understand that
office today, but had an essentially investigative and prosecutorial
function. England did not have a professional police force until the 19th
century, so it is not surprising that other government officers performed
the investigative functions now associated primarily with the police.
The involvement of government officers in the production of
testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are
police or justices of the peace.272
Accordingly, to explain why he went beyond framing-era practice, Justice Scalia
invoked the now-familiar problem of changed circumstances which, as we have

265. Id. at 50–68.
266. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
267. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60–68.
268. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 189–93; Scalia, supra note 8, at 871–72.
269. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They
Know It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
270. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–56.
271. Id. at 43–50.
272. Id. at 53 (citations omitted).
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seen, so often requires originalists to retreat to some form of weak originalexpected-applications originalism or semantic originalism. Yet, as we have also
seen, weak original-expected-applications originalism and semantic originalism are
usually indistinguishable from nonoriginalism, and Crawford bears this out as well.
Justice Scalia’s claim that the confrontation requirement must change with
police practice is little different than the nonoriginalist argument for extending the
Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on compelling any person “to be a witness against
himself”273 to police interrogation so that the Constitution can evolve in tandem
with investigative practice.274 Yet, Justice Scalia had previously characterized the
extension of the Fifth Amendment to “extrajudicial custodial interrogation” in
Miranda v. Arizona275 as “a doubtful proposition as a matter both of history and
precedent;”276 but, he made essentially the same move in Crawford, treating an
unsworn interviewee who previously made statements to police officers but who
does not actually testify in any official proceeding as a “witness against” an
accused. There may be good reasons for this conclusion, but it is hardly required by
the original meaning of the term “witness.” The only historical evidence of original
meaning identified by the Court in Crawford was the definition of “witness” found
in the second edition of Webster’s American Dictionary: “those who ‘bear
testimony,’” with “‘testimony,’ in turn,” defined as “‘[a] solemn declaration or
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.’”277 Whether
a statement made to police investigators outside of the confines of a formal judicial
investigation has the requisite solemnity, however, is a question simply not
resolved by this definition.278 Instead, the question whether a police interviewee is a
“witness” within the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment presents a classic
example of textual vagueness or ambiguity requiring nonoriginalist construction.
In truth, it is hard to see what originalism adds to the mix in Crawford. Nothing
more than textual argument is necessary to support the holding; after all, the
approach of Ohio v. Roberts cannot be squared with the text of the Confrontation
Clause. The textual requirement of confrontation is absolute: it admits of no
exception for testimony falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or that
otherwise reflects indicia of reliability. Crawford itself makes the point quite
nicely: “Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually

273. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
274. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on
the “New” Fifth Amendment and the Old “Voluntariness” Test, 65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966),
reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSION: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41, 41–
68 (1980).
275. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
276. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 447 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
277. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 114 (1828)) (brackets in original) (emphasis added).
278. The view of one leading scholar is that “the Framers did not address whether the
Confrontation Clause should apply to nontestimonial hearsay evidence because they never
anticipated that informal hearsay statements could come to be viewed as valid evidence in
criminal trials–as they have.” Davies, supra note 269, at 107.
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prescribes: confrontation.”279 Thus, the answer to the constitutional question posed
by Crawford is hardwired into the Constitution itself—what the Sixth Amendment
requires is not reliability but confrontation, and Roberts never claimed that the
textual requirement of “confronting” adverse witnesses could be satisfied by the
use of testimony from a witness the accused had never questioned. As we have
seen, nonoriginalism no less than originalism treats constitutional text as binding.
Inquiry into original meaning was accordingly beside the point in Crawford; the
problem with Roberts was that its approach conflicted with the text of the
Confrontation Clause. The only hard question in Crawford was whether to treat
unsworn interviewees whose statements are later offered in evidence through the
testimony of police investigators as “witnesses” subject to the confrontation
requirement. The decision to extend the confrontation requirement to unsworn
interviewees, however, relied on the same nonoriginalist rationale that the Court
had earlier employed in Miranda.
One might respond that had the Court taken a consistently originalist approach
to the Confrontation Clause, at least it might have avoided the error of Roberts.
Even this position, however, cannot be sustained. The text of the Confrontation
Clause is simple; the Court’s error in Roberts was in ignoring the text. Inquiry into
original meaning, as it turns out, may only complicate. In Crawford, it was Chief
Justice Rehnquist who sought to preserve Roberts; he believed that the evidence
from the framing-era was in conflict and argued that there were framing-era
precedents suggesting that testimony accompanied by adequate indicia of reliability
was considered admissible even if the witness had never been questioned by the
accused.280 This, of course, is an originalist argument, and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
as it happens, was an originalist.281 As Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in
Crawford demonstrates, once one leaves the text behind and starts digging into the
frequently conflicting and confusing historical evidence, things can get
complicated. Rather than enhancing textual argument in Crawford, arguments
based on framing-era meaning were at least as likely to confuse matters.
B. Apprendi v. New Jersey
Another seeming win for originalism was Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the
Court invalidated a New Jersey statute authorizing the sentencing judge to impose
an enhanced sentence for offenses that the judge found to have been racially
motivated.282 The Court held that any factual finding that could increase the
authorized sentence, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a jury by virtue of the Due Process
Clause and the Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury.283 The Court invoked

279. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
280. See id. at 72–74 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
281. See Harry M. Clor, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Balances of Constitutional
Democracy, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 557 (1994); Richard W. Garnett, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Enduring, Democratic Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395 (2006); William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693 (1976).
282. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
283. Id. at 490.
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framing-era practice to support its holding, noting that in the framing era, criminal
cases were decided by a jury and required proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and in imposing these requirements, framing-era practice drew no distinction
between the adjudication of guilt and factors bearing on the defendant’s
sentence.284 Accordingly, the decision is usually characterized as originalist in
character.285 Under the New Jersey statute, however, the defendant’s motive
determined only the sentencing range rather than guilt or innocence, and, as the
Court acknowledged, in the framing era there was no general understanding
regarding the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury when it came to
sentencing, since specific sentences were generally prescribed for each offense.286
In dissent, Justice O’Connor made much of this point, arguing that in the framing
era, there was no understanding about the manner in which facts that bore only on
sentencing should be adjudicated.287 To this point, the Court responded by relying
on “the principles that emerged from the Framers’ fears ‘that the jury right could be
lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.’”288
Whatever the merit of the Court’s concern for erosion of the jury right, it is not
originalist. Apprendi cannot be justified in terms of original-expected-applications
originalism since there was no framing-era understanding with respect to the
manner in which discretionary sentencing authority could be exercised. In the
framing era, “overt sentencing discretion was a new development that had not yet
taken firm shape.”289 Indeed, when it addressed the question whether the enhanced
penalty in the federal carjacking statute for offenses that result in death or serious
bodily injury must be proven to a jury beyond reasonable doubt in the Term before
Apprendi, the Court admitted that “the scholarship of which we are aware does not
show that a question exactly like this one was ever raised and resolved in the period
before the framing.”290 To be sure, there was no framing-era precedent for
increasing the authorized sentence based on a finding made by a judge, but the
Court did not claim that the original meaning of the pertinent constitutional

284. Id. at 476–81.
285. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 8, at 1054–56; Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97
GEO. L.J. 657, 689 (2009); Scalia, supra note 8, at 872.
286. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479–80. Some sentencing discretion was permitted for
misdemeanors, but imprisonment was rarely imposed as a punishment for these offenses
until the late eighteenth century. Id. at 480 n.7.
287. Id. at 525–29 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
288. Id. at 483 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 247–48 (1999)).
289. Bibas, supra note 8, at 196. What little sentencing discretion that existed seems to
have involved downgrading felony sentences and imposing misdemeanor sentences, and
there judges seem to have exercised broad sentencing discretion without need of juries, as
they did when indeterminate sentencing emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, and with
respect to factual allegations that could increase the authorized sentence, nineteenth-century
courts invariably analyzed this question as nonconstitutional in character and reached results
that were hardly uniform. See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1124–32 (2001). Beyond
that, as the Court subsequently recognized, in the framing era judges generally had discretion
in deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences in cases involving
multiple convictions. See Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 167–70 (2009).
290. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 244 (1999).
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provisions froze in place framing-era sentencing procedures. To the contrary, the
Court stressed that there was no constitutional impediment to the emergence of
sentencing discretion as a consequence of “the 19th-century shift in this country
from statutes providing fixed-term sentences to those providing judges discretion
within a permissible range . . . .”291 Thus, whatever one’s view of the Court’s
rationale, it cannot be supported by original expected applications. Apprendi
addressed an issue that simply did not arise in the framing era, and as we have seen,
original-expected-applications originalism is of no aid in such cases.292
Nor does Apprendi reflect semantic originalism. Even if the Court was correct
that the framers feared that the jury right could be eroded by procedural innovation,
the Court offered no criterion based on the framing-era meaning of constitutional
text for identifying impermissible erosion. The Court acknowledged that as long as
a judge’s finding is not the basis to increase the legally authorized sentence, judges
may exercise “broad discretion in sentencing,”293 even though such discretion goes
far beyond framing-era practice, and also has the potential to erode the jury right, as
Justice O’Connor argued in dissent.294 The Court’s only response to this point was
that “structural democratic constraints” are likely to circumscribe the extent of the
discretion that legislatures will vest in sentencing judges.295 This argument may be
persuasive, but it is not originalist—it is a structural argument not linked to the
original meaning of any constitutional text. To be sure, there was no framing-era
precedent for increasing the authorized sentence based on a judge’s finding, but as
we have seen, semantic originalism rejects framing-era practice as the determinant
of original meaning. Indeed, the Court’s holding permits erosion of the jury’s
control over sentencing by allowing the exercise of judicial sentencing discretion as
long as discretion is not tied to the sentencing judge’s factual findings. Yet, the
Court offered no historical evidence of original semantic meaning to support its
rule about the permissible scope of sentencing discretion, nor could it, given that
judicial sentencing discretion had not yet developed in the framing era, and
therefore framing-era semantic meaning reflected no understanding about the
extent to which the emergence of judicial sentencing discretion could be reconciled
with the Constitution’s text.296

291. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
292. See supra Part I.A.1.
293. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481.
294. Id. at 546–49 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For a more elaborate analysis along these
lines, see Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 297, 319–29.
295. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
296. Justice Thomas’s separate opinion was no more originalist. It relied on nineteenthcentury cases holding that facts that increased the authorized punishment, such as the value
of stolen property, must be treated as elements of the offense to be alleged in the indictment
and proven to a jury, although all of the pertinent authorities treated the matter as one of state
law save an 1872 treatise, which stated the rule as based on the common law as well as
constitutional requirements. Id. at 501–18 (Thomas, J., concurring). In this, Justice Thomas
may have overstated the historical evidence, see Bibas, supra note 289, at 1128–32, but even
putting that problem aside, this evidence could support an originalist argument only if linked
to a claim that the original meaning of the Due Process Clause or the Sixth Amendment was
to preserve framing-era practice. Yet, Justice Thomas did not advance such a claim. To the
contrary, he joined the Court’s opinion blessing the emergence of sentencing discretion
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Thus, there is very little about Apprendi that qualifies as originalist. This should
be unsurprising—since guilt and punishment went hand in hand in the framing era,
the jury’s verdict simultaneously determined both guilt and punishment; there was
no need to develop a framing-era understanding about the role of the jury in
sentencing because there was no distinction between the jury’s verdict and the
resulting sentence. In an era in which guilt and punishment are not so tightly
linked, however, original meaning supplies no reliable guide for determining what
role the jury should have in sentencing.297 Apprendi is perhaps a classic example in
which changed circumstances undermined reliance on framing-era practice or
framing-era semantic meaning as a reliable guide for constitutional adjudication.
C. District of Columbia v. Heller
The same inability to utilize original meaning to resolve the critical issues
pervades the ostensibly originalist decision in District of Columbia v. Heller,298
where the Court addressed the question whether, in light of the Second
Amendment’s prefatory admonition, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State,” the Second Amendment recognition of “the right of the
people to keep and bear arms”299 conferred “an individual right to possess a firearm
unconnected with service in a militia . . . .”300 The majority came down on the
individual-rights side, characterizing this as “the original understanding of the
Second Amendment,”301 while the dissenters concluded that the Second
Amendment “secure[d] to the people a right to use and possess arms in connection
with service in a well-regulated militia.”302 Heller has been described as “the most
explicitly and self-consciously originalist opinion in the history of the Supreme
Court.”303 Yet, it is hard to understand how the original meaning of the Second
subsequent to the framing era despite its potential to erode the jury right, adding, “Of course
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not codify common-law procedure wholesale.” Id. at
500 n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring).
297. The same point emerged as the Court applied Apprendi to invalidate Washington’s
sentencing guidelines in Blakeley v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). The Court held that
even though the sentence in that case was within the statutorily authorized maximum,
because it could not be lawfully imposed under the guidelines except on the basis of a factual
finding made by the sentencing judge, it ran afoul of Apprendi. See id. at 303–04. Rejecting
an argument that the use of sentencing guidelines to channel sentencing discretion within a
statutorily authorized range did not involve impermissible erosion of the jury right, the Court
wrote: “[T]he very reason the Framers put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that
they were unwilling to trust government to mark out the role of the jury.” Id. at 308. Yet,
because sentencing discretion had yet to emerge, the framing era had developed no
understanding about whether sentencing discretion would impermissibly erode the function
of the jury if exercised on the basis of factual findings but not otherwise in terms of either an
original expected application or original semantic meaning.
298. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
299. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
300. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577.
301. Id. at 625.
302. Id. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
303. Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimialism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 246, 246 (2008) (footnote omitted).
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Amendment spoke to the question before the Court. Once again, the problem of
changed circumstances rears its ugly head.
In the framing era, the question whether there was a right to keep and bear arms
unconnected to service in an organized militia would have been a non sequitur. As
the Court acknowledged, in the framing era, the militia was not a select group that
had been conscripted into a formal military organization, but rather “the body of all
citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons
that they possessed at home to militia duty.”304 Thus, everyone thought capable of
bearing arms was thought a part of the militia, and by ensuring that all those
available to be called to militia service had a right to keep and bear arms that could
be brought with them when called to duty, the Second Amendment was
inextricably intertwined with militia service, even if it facilitated individual selfdefense and other individual uses of arms as well. The Court, in other words,
endeavored to use original meaning in order to address a question that never arose
in the framing era. For that reason, reliance on original expected applications was a
dead end.
Thus, Heller seems to reflect semantic originalism more than any original
expected application of the Second Amendment. Indeed, in the vein of semantic
originalism, when it addressed the District’s reliance on the Second Amendment’s
preamble reflecting a limitation on Second Amendment rights to possession and
use of arms in relation to service in an organized militia, the Court did not invoke
framing-era practice, but instead reasoned that “[l]ogic demands that there be a link
between the stated purpose and the command,” adding that the “requirement of
logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an ambiguity in the
operative clause,” but beyond that, “a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the
scope of the operative clause.”305 As for the operative clause, the Court defined the
right to “keep” arms as the right to “have” or possess them,306 and the right to
“bear” arms as the right to “carry[] for a particular purpose—confrontation,”307 and
then, finding no ambiguity, concluded that the preamble did not limit the scope of
the operative right but merely “announces the purpose for which the right was
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”308 Yet, the Court made no claim that
its view of the logical relation between preamble and operative clause was familiar
to the framing-era public, despite its admonition that “[n]ormal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings
that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”309

304. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627. The dissenters added that the first militia act, enacted in the
same year that the Second Amendment was ratified, defined the militia as “every ablebodied white male citizen between the ages of 18 and 45” and required each “to ‘provide
himself with a good musket or firelock’ and other specified weaponry.” Id. at 672 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271).
305. Id. at 577–78 (citations omitted).
306. Id. at 582–83.
307. Id. at 584.
308. Id. at 599.
309. Id. at 576–77. The view of Professors McGinnis and Rappaport that originalism
entails the use of original interpretive methods would presumably warrant resort to a
framing-era rule of construction even if unfamiliar to the public, but as we have seen, that
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Given that the framing-era public never had occasion to consider whether the right
to bear arms could be separated from militia service, the Court could not have made
such a claim. Perhaps as a matter of ordinary semantic meaning, the Court’s view
about the relation between a preamble and an operative clause is sound, but this is a
purely textual argument not based on historical evidence of original meaning.310
But put all this aside and assume that Heller’s handling of the preamble is
defensible on originalist grounds despite the ahistorical character of the question
whether the right to keep and bear arms could be separated from militia service.
Even so, originalism offers no defense for the Court’s decision to invalidate the
District’s handgun ban. After all, the District argued that it had not infringed the
right to keep and bear arms because it permitted its residents to possess some types
of “arms,” such as long guns, even though it had banned handguns.311 To this, the
Court had neither a textual nor an originalist response—perhaps because the
District had indeed identified an ambiguity in the Second Amendment. Instead, the
Court wrote that “[t]he handgun ban amounts to a prohibition of an entire class of
‘arms’ that is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for that lawful
purpose,” and that the ban “extends, moreover, to the home, where the need for
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”312 The Court added that “[f]ew
laws in the history of our Nation have come close to the severe restriction of the
District’s handgun ban. And some of those few have been struck down.”313
Handguns, the Court wrote, are considered “the quintessential self-defense
weapon.”314 Rejecting Justice Breyer’s proposed balancing test, the Court added:
“We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has
been subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”315 Nevertheless,
despite having defined the original meaning of the right to “keep” arms as the right
to “have” them and the right to “bear” arms as the right to “carry” them “in case of
confrontation,”316 the Court characterized as “presumptively lawful”317 a number of
view logically entails original-expected-applications originalism, see supra text
accompanying notes 35–36, and, indeed, McGinnis and Rappaport embrace intentionalism
as an original interpretive method, including reliance on original intended applications. See
McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 36, at 378–81. Yet, original-expected-applications
originalism is particularly problematic in Heller given that the question whether Second
Amendment rights existed independent from the needs of the militia would have had no
meaning to the framing generation.
310. For a straightforward textual argument in favor of the position taken by the Court in
Heller, see Nelson Lund, D.C.’s Handgun Ban and the Constitutional Right to Arms: One
Hard Question?, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 229, 236–40 (2008). There is, however, an
argument that in the framing era, the phrase “bear arms” had a specifically military meaning,
making the Second Amendment sufficiently ambiguous to warrant resort to the preamble.
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 646–52 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saul Cornell, Heller, New
Originalism, and Law Office History: “Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss,” 56
UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1101–10 (2009).
311. Heller, 554 U.S. at 629.
312. Id. at 628.
313. Id. at 629.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 634.
316. Id. at 592.
317. Id. at 627 n.26.

2012]

ORIGINALISM IN PRACTICE

1241

laws circumscribing the ability to possess or carry firearms, including “prohibitions
on carrying concealed weapons” and “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by
felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”318
Commentators puzzling over this portion of the opinion have suggested that the
Court adopted a categorical approach in which “core” Second Amendment interests
receive something close to absolute protection while more peripheral interests are
subject to greater regulation.319 What is striking about this core-and-penumbra
approach, however, is that nothing about it is originalist. As for original expected
applications, the Court claimed no historical support for a core-and-penumbra
approach; what is more, the regulations that the Court identified as presumptively
lawful have little or no framing-era support. Prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons, for example, did not emerge in the United States until the 1810s and
1820s, in response to a surge in violent crime.320 Laws prohibiting the possession of
firearms by convicted felons became widespread only in the twentieth century, in
response to a crime wave following the First World War.321 The Court even
acknowledged that there was little framing-era regulation aside from laws
addressing gunpowder storage and the discharge of firearms.322 Unsurprisingly, a
number of originalists have objected to this portion of this opinion because of its
lack of framing-era support,323 and nonoriginalists have chided the Court for
inconsistency.324
As for semantic originalism, as we have seen, it usually offers little meaningful
difference from nonoriginalism, and Heller again proves the point. As we have
seen, the historically fixed meaning of constitutional text played no role in the
Court’s ahistorical core-and-penumbra approach. The Court was forced to utilize a

318. Id. at 626–27 (footnote omitted).
319. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 404–10 (2009); Solum, supra note 11, at 976–
77.
320. See, e.g., SAUL CORNELL, A WELL-REGULATED MILITIA: THE FOUNDING FATHERS
AND THE ORIGINS OF GUN CONTROL IN AMERICA 138–44 (Oxford Univ. Press eds., 2000);
Saul Cornell, The Early American Origins of the Modern Gun Control Debate: The Right To
Bear Arms, Firearms Regulation, and the Lessons of History, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
571, 581–85 (2006).
321. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 695, 698–728 (2009).
322. Heller, 554 U.S. at 631–34.
323. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1371, 1373–79 (2009); Lund,
supra note 196, at 1356–62.
324. See, e.g., Philip J. Cook, Jens Ludwig & Adam M. Samaha, Gun Control After
Heller: Threats and Sideshows from a Social Welfare Perspective, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1041,
1064–66 (2009); Rory K. Little, Heller and Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism’s Last
Gasp, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1427 (2009); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 198–99 (2008); Mark Tushnet,
Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419, 429 (2009); Adam
Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1557–65 (2009).
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nonoriginalist approach because of the ambiguity of the constitutional text on
whether the right to keep and bear arms protects the possession and carrying of
every type of arms or only requires that the people can possess and carry some type
of arms. Given this ambiguity, resort to nonoriginalism was inescapable; even
originalists concede that textual vagueness or ambiguity requires nonoriginalist
construction.325 The Court’s core-and-penumbra approach may be preferable to
Justice Breyer’s balancing if one accepts the Court’s view that rights receive too
uncertain protection under balancing tests,326 but that view is no more based on the
historically fixed meaning of constitutional text than the interest balancing of
Justice Breyer.
D. The (Limited) Place for Originalism in Practice
Accordingly, when it comes to cases of textual vagueness or ambiguity, where
nonoriginalists claim license for their brand of constitutional adjudication, in actual
practice, neither original expected applications nor semantic originalism are of
much use. Instead, in the face of textual vagueness or ambiguity—precisely what
gives rise to constitutional litigation in actual practice—nonoriginalism is where
the action is.
This is not to suggest that original meaning plays no role in constitutional
adjudication. As we have seen, some constitutional provisions, such as the Seventh
Amendment, amount to textual commands to assess constitutional meaning by
reference to framing-era practice.327 Thus, Seventh Amendment adjudication
centers on framing-era practice, even though the Court is often forced to engage in
rough analogies when assessing whether the right to a jury trial applies to actions
unknown at common law.328 An originalist inquiry may be hard wired into the text
in other ways; for example, when the Constitution uses a framing-era term of art,
such as its prohibitions on “ex post facto Law[s],”329 interpretation necessarily
begins with the framing-era meaning of that term.330 And, sometimes, a
semantically plausible reading of the text can be ruled out by reference to its
original meaning; to appropriate John Ely’s example, some of the Constitution’s

325. See supra notes 26–27.
326. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
328. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708–21 (1999);
Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 564–73 (1990); Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 40–65 (1989); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–27 (1987);
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 192–97 (1974). Beyond this, despite its seeming textual
commitment to originalism, the Seventh Amendment contains many latent complexities; for
example, perhaps the modern liberalization in pleading and related procedural rules
constitutes a changed circumstance that could warrant affording judges greater power to
review the sufficiency of the evidence than was thought necessary under the more
demanding procedural rules of the framing-era regime. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism
and Summary Judgment, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 928–32 (2010).
329. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, cl. 3, 10, cl. 1.
330. See, e.g., Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 610–16 (2003); Carmell v. Texas, 529
U.S. 513, 521–30 (2000).
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“provisions, such as the one requiring that the President be a ‘natural born Citizen,’
may need a reference to historical usage so as to exclude certain alternative
constructions–conceivably if improbably here, a requirement of legitimacy (or
illegitimacy!) or non-Caesarian birth.”331
These, however, are the rare cases. The Seventh Amendment’s textual reference
to framing-era common law appears nowhere else in the Constitution. While there
are a few framing-era terms of art in the Constitution, most of it remains accessible
to the contemporary reader, and the meaning of its terms has, for the most part,
changed little, if at all, since the framing era. Framing-era semantic meaning can
occasionally resolve ambiguities; but the fact that the Constitution uses words the
meaning of which are largely unchanged since the framing makes these problems
rare; no one, for example, really needs to study history to know that the Natural
Born Citizen Clause does not mean that only the legitimate or non-Caesarian born
are eligible to serve as President.332
Originalism is unnecessary when a constitutional debate can be resolved by the
text itself; originalism is of aid in constitutional adjudication if it can utilize
original meaning to resolve textual vagueness or ambiguity. As we have seen,
however, original-expected-applications originalism as a means of addressing
textual vagueness or ambiguity is fraught with peril; even the framing generation
may not have intended that its own understandings and practices be applied to
radically altered circumstances. Semantic originalism is no more successful. For
highly specific constitutional texts, original semantic meaning is sufficiently
constraining, but as we have seen, textualism is no less likely to provide constraint
in such cases. When the text is written at a high level of generality, in contrast, the
original semantic meaning becomes so expansive that it cannot be distinguished
from nonoriginalism. Semantic originalists, to be sure, commence constitutional
adjudication with ritual incantations of original meaning, but at the end of the day,
decidedly nonoriginalist conceptions of liberty, equality, or other nonoriginalist
considerations do the analytical heavy lifting.
To be sure, history can be of aid to constitutional law. Just as Holmes famously
denounced slavish adherence to historical practice, he also wrote, famously as well,
that “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.”333 Indeed. In McDonald v. City
of Chicago,334 for example, a four-justice plurality, as it considered whether the
Second Amendment’s right to keep and bear arms is protected against the states by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, did not tether its inquiry to the
original meaning of the Clause but instead employed a nonoriginalist test asking
whether the Second Amendment was sufficiently “fundamental from an American
perspective” to merit incorporation within the Fourteenth335—yet it nevertheless
consulted history in an effort to determine whether Second Amendment rights had

331. ELY, supra note 185, at 13.
332. There are, however, some close cases involving the Natural Born Citizen Clause in
which historical evidence of original meaning may prove useful. See William T. Han,
Beyond Presidential Eligibility: The Natural Born Citizen Clause as a Source of Birthright
Citizenship, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 457, 460–76 (2010).
333. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
334. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
335. Id. at 3046 (opinion of Alito, J.).
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gained widespread acceptance in national history.336 In this sense, historical
inquiry, though not conclusive, can provide valuable rigor to adjudication.337
Consulting history as a guide, however, stops far short of originalism’s insistence
that historically fixed meanings of constitutional text control constitutional
adjudication.
As the survey of recent ostensibly originalist decisions above makes plain,
authentically originalist adjudication is something like the Loch Ness Monster—
much discussed, but rarely encountered. In constitutional adjudication,
nonoriginalism is where the action is.
***
Some years ago, my onetime teacher, Laurence Tribe, in the course of noting
Ronald Dworkin’s claimed conversion to originalism, wrote, “[w]e are all
originalists now,”338 a seeming concession that evoked more than a little
comment.339 Perhaps Professor Tribe got it backwards.

336. Id. at 3036–44 (opinion of the Court). This is not to suggest that the Court’s
treatment of history was impeccable; it was not. For example, to support its claim that the
Congress that framed the Fourteenth Amendment considered Second Amendment rights
fundamental, the Court cited the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Acts of 1866. See id.
at 3040–41. Yet, there is powerful evidence that these statutes were antidiscrimination
requirements rather than protection of substantive rights including the right to bear arms. See
Nelson Lund, Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (or Are There More?) in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 63 FLA. L. REV. 487, 496–500 (2011); Rosenthal, supra note 228, at 381–84. In
fact, the Court itself has long construed the Civil Rights Act as an antidiscrimination
provision. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 384–91
(1982). Justice Thomas’s separate opinion also involves a highly selective presentation of
the pertinent historical evidence. See Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm,
Colloquy Debate: McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun
Control Laws?, 105 NW. U.L. REV. 437, 460–63 (2011). Indeed, the selective presentation of
evidence in McDonald calls to mind the perils of “law office history,” in which historical
evidence of original meaning is assessed with an advocate’s jaundiced eye that cherry-picks
only the evidence supporting a predetermined conclusion. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, The
People’s Constitution vs. the Lawyer’s Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the
Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 334–37 (2011); Alfred H.
Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 119, 155–58; Larry D.
Kramer, When Lawyers Do History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 387, 402–07 (2003); John
Phillip Reid, Law and History, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 193, 197–204 (1993). There is some
empirical evidence suggesting just this problem in the Court’s use of historical evidence. See
Smith, supra note 22, at 256–87.
337. For what is likely the classic statement of this position, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 103–10
(Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1962).
338. Tribe, supra note 23, at 67.
339. See, e.g., Gregory Bassham, Justice Scalia’s Equitable Constitution, 33 J.C. & U.L.
143, 154 (2006); Berman, supra note 16, at 29 & n.72; Robert Henry, Do Judges Think?
Comments on Several Papers Presented at the Duke Law Journal’s Conference on
Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1709 (2009); Jeffrey Rosen, Translating
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1241, 1244 (1998); Rosenthal,
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supra note 232, at 4; Bryan H. Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: Revisiting the
Original Understanding of the Bill of Rights in 1866–67, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1509, 1529 & n.63
(2007); R. George Wright, Originalism and the Problem of Fundamental Fairness, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 687, 688 & n.11 (2008).

